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Abstract
This dissertation is comprised of three essays on the Child Care Tax Credit (CCTC) program
in the United States. I analyze how the Child Care Tax Credit affects the budget constraints faced by
mothers, and how changes in mothers’ budget constraints affect maternal labor supply. Furthermore,
I examine how the Child Care Tax Credit affects children’s educational achievement through mothers’
time allocation. Understanding the employment and time allocation adjustment of the women with
young children, according to the tax programs and child care subsidies, is important for theoretical
and practical reasons. Examining the influence of the tax subsidy on children’s cognitive and non-
cognitive development can provide important information for policy makers.
In the first chapter, I explore the effects of the Child Care Tax Credit on maternal labor
supply. Childbearing is the main factor that affects the labor supply of women. Many studies show
that the cost of child care services has a significant impact on the labor supply of women with young
children. The Child Care Tax credit is a child care subsidy program that allows working parents to
claim a tax credit for their child care expenses. In the study, I document a comprehensive legislative
history of the CCTC enactments, amendments, and repeals at both federal and state levels. Using
the CCTC variation generated by exogenous law changes and focusing on mothers between the ages
of 20 to 55 in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, I estimate the effects of the CCTC on maternal
labor supply. Using differences-in-differences estimation and policy shocks measured at the state
level, I found that a $1000 increase in the CCTC increases the maternal labor force participation
rate by three percentage points. To incorporate the policy variation within a state, I construct an
individual CCTC treatment variable for each woman using observable individual characteristics and
state specific regulation. I use the state-level CCTC treatment variable as the instrumental variable
for the individual CCTC treatment variable and find that a $1000 increase in CCTC increases the
maternal labor force participation rate by six percentage points. The effects are more pronounced
ii
in married mothers than single mothers.
In chapter two, I explore the effects of the Child Care Tax Credit on children’s long-term
educational achievement. Since the CCTC is effective in encouraging mothers to join the labor force,
the question that follows is: how would the CCTC affect the well-being of children? Potentially,
there are two main channels in which the CCTC affects the well-being of children. The CCTC
reduces the cost of child care services and encourages mothers to join the labor market. More family
income can help the development of the children; this can be categorized as an income effect. The
tax credit also affects the mother’s time allocation, and the change of time exposed to child care
intensity also affects the development of the child. I document a comprehensive legislative history
of the CCTC enactments, amendments, and repeals at both federal and state levels. Using the
detailed CCTC legislative variation generated by exogenous law changes and applying the variation
on data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, I examine the long-term effects of the CCTC
policy exposure from early ages on the educational achievement of the child. Results show that
CCTC policy exposure from early ages has negative effects on educational achievement of the child
in adulthood.
In chapter three, I explore the relationship between the early ages Child Care Tax Credit
policy exposure and children’s well-being measured at early ages. Using the detailed CCTC leg-
islative variation generated by exogenous law changes and applying the variation on data from the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979
Child and Young Adult, I examine the short-term effects of the early age CCTC policy exposure
on the educational achievement and behavioral problems of the child. Results show that early age
CCTC policy exposure has negative effects on the reading score of the child, which shows evidence
that the mother’s time allocation effect dominates the income effect of the tax credit for the marginal
population.
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Chapter 1
The Effects of the Child Care Tax
Credit on Maternal Labor Supply
1.1 Introduction
The Child Care Tax Credit (CCTC) is a child care subsidy program enacted in 1976.1 It
allows parents to claim a tax credit for their child care expenses while they are working.2 It was
estimated that there were 6.25 million families who claimed $3.47 billion in federal CCTC in 2017
(Ackerman et al., 2016). Previous research uses coarse and incomplete measurements of the policy
to estimate the effect of the CCTC on maternal labor supply (S. L. Averett et al., 1997; Leibowitz
et al., 1992; Michalopoulos et al., 1992). In this paper, I collect detailed CCTC legislative history
and construct precise policy treatment variables to analyze how the CCTC affects the labor supply
of women with young children, and which demographic groups are most responsive to the policy.
The labor force participation rate of working age women in the United States rose from
50% in the 1960s to the highest level of 75% at the end of the 1990s. This increase was mainly
driven by married mothers (Juhn and Potter, 2006). However, since the year 2000 the female labor
force participation rate in the United States has been decreasing and is now lower than the rate in
many other industrial countries (F. Blau and Kahn, 2013). It appears that giving birth to children
1 The CCTC is also referred to as the “child and dependent care tax credit” or the “dependent care tax credit”.
2 In contrast to tax deductions, which reduce the income used to calculate personal income tax, CCTC is a tax
credit and directly reduces tax liability, dollar for dollar.
1
significantly affects the labor supply of women. Figure 1.1 shows the female labor force participation
rate before and after giving birth to the first child. Before the birth of the first child, women of all
cohorts have a labor force participation rate of about 90%. After giving birth to the first child, the
female labor force participation rate drops significantly.3 Women tend to reenter the labor market
when their children are older, and alternative child care is cheaper, suggesting that the cost of
market-provided child care services are essential factors that affect the labor supply of women with
young children (D. Blau and Robins, 1988; D. Blau and Robins, 1998; Connelly, 1992; J. Heckman,
1974; Ribar, 1992).
The legislative objective of the CCTC is to increase the labor force attachment of parents
with young children, especially mothers. Therefore, the CCTC is designed as an employment-related
subsidy policy rather than a pure welfare program. For married couples, both parents have to be
employed to be eligible for the tax credit. A single parent has to work to qualify for the credit. For
a divorced couple, the primary care provider is required to work to be eligible. Parents must also
pay for child care expenses in the market to claim the credit (Typical eligible expenses include the
cost of daycare centers, after-school care facilities, or summer camps). Thus, the CCTC encourages
the use of formal child care rather than informal care (e.g., child care provided by older children in
the family).
Since the enactment of the federal CCTC, many states have enacted their own versions.
The state-level CCTC legislation varies in the timing of enactments and amendments, as well as in
its generosity, phase-out rate, and many other aspects. The state-level CCTC variation provides an
identification opportunity to estimate the responsiveness of the maternal labor supply to child care
costs and subsidies.
There are not many studies that examine the effectiveness of the CCTC on labor supply,
and even fewer make use of the multi-dimensional variation of the policy. Michalopoulos et al. (1992)
use the 1984 wave of Survey of Income and Program Participation to estimate the effect of child
care subsidies on child care expenses. They simulate child care expenses and mothers’ labor supply
under various counterfactual federal CCTC policy settings, finding that the CCTC increases both
the demand for market-provided child care services and maternal labor supply. Leibowitz et al.
(1992) use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 to study the responsiveness of mothers’
3 The patterns shown in Figure 1.1 are consistent with existing research on this topic (e.g., Goldin and Mitchell
(2017)).
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labor supply to changes in the availability and cost of non-maternal child care after intervals of three
months and two years since the birth of the first child. Their findings show that mothers who are
eligible for a large amount of the CCTC within three months after giving birth to their first child
are more likely to return to the labor market.
These studies use cross-sectional data and cross-sectional variation of state CCTC docu-
mented by D. Blau (1991), without using the variation generated by specific state CCTC regulation
on eligibility and phasing-out rates. The CCTC variation used in these studies is measured only at
the specified maximum level. The estimates obtained from using cross-sectional variation suffer from
the confounding effects of many other co-existing state-level policies, the results depend heavily on
the year chosen to perform the studies.
S. L. Averett et al. (1997) use the 1986 wave of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
1979 to estimate the kinked budget constraint generated by the federal CCTC. They simulate the
labor supply response under different counterfactual federal CCTC policy settings and find that the
federal CCTC significantly affects maternal labor supply. However, since a few states have very
generous state-level CCTC in some years, not incorporating the state-level CCTC leads to biased
estimates. Guner et al. (2017) use a macroeconomic structural model and simulate the effects of
expanding the federal CCTC coverage. They find that expanding the coverage of the CCTC increases
the female labor force participation, an effect that is significant mainly for lower-skilled women.
Some studies examine the effect of child care subsidy programs in the context of other
industrial countries. For example, Blundell, Costa Dias, et al. (2016) estimate female labor supply
under child-related tax credit and welfare programs in Britain and find that mothers (especially single
mothers) are very responsive to subsidy programs. Bick (2016) analyzes the relationship between
child care programs and the labor supply of women in West Germany and finds that the child care
subsidy policies positively affect maternal labor supply. Olivetti and Petrongolo (2017) survey and
summarize the child care programs and their impact on maternal labor supply in many industrial
countries, showing positive effects of subsidized child care on female employment. Nonetheless, no
research uses the United States CCTC variation over time, across states and individuals, to perform
a reduced-form analysis and explore the causal relationship between the CCTC and maternal labor
supply.
The CCTC legislative history is not documented in a rigorous and organized manner. The
National Women’s Law Center published reports “Making Care Less Taxing,” which collected de-
3
tailed information about the state CCTC but only for a few years (for example, Campbell et al.
(2011)). Using the TAXSIM program of the National Bureau of Economic Research, one can cal-
culate the approximated federal and state-level CCTC (Feenberg and Coutts, 1993). However,
TAXSIM does not provide the details of the regulation used to calculate the tax credit. Also,
TAXSIM does not incorporate information on the eligible age of the children, so the calculation is
still not accurate enough.
Therefore, I document the legislative history of the federal and state-level CCTC and con-
struct a comprehensive panel data set of the policy variation from 1976 to 2015. Focusing on women
from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), I use the exogenous policy shocks especially at
the state level to estimate the effects of the CCTC on maternal labor supply. The challenge here is
that the CCTC changes the entire budget constraint faced by a woman, a woman then maximizes
her utility by choosing the optimal point along the new budget line.4 Therefore the actual CCTC
a woman claims is endogenous. To tackle this issue, I first use the maximum state-level CCTC
as a proxy for the generosity of the state in providing its CCTC, and perform the differences-in-
differences analysis with treatment intensity. In doing so, I compare the labor supply behavior of
women living in states or years with different CCTC generosities.
The pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation shows that, on average, a $1000 in-
crease in the CCTC increases the female labor force participation rate by three percentage points.
Comparing the effect of the CCTC by subgroups generated by the age of the youngest child, I find
that the effect of the CCTC on labor force participation is more pronounced in women with older
eligible children. In addition, among subgroups of married women generated by the husband income
quantile, women whose husbands are in the top income quantile are relatively more responsive to
the CCTC by joining the labor market. After controlling for individual fixed effects to deal with
unobserved heterogeneity, I find that a $1000 increase in the CCTC increases maternal labor force
participation rate by approximately two percentage points.
To incorporate the multi-dimensional policy variation generated by the state CCTC legis-
lation, I construct an individual CCTC treatment variable using the husband’s income (which is
zero for single women) and the number of CCTC eligible children in the household as individual
characteristics. I use the maximum CCTC each woman can claim from a state as a proxy for the
policy faced by each woman. The OLS estimation using differences-in-differences method and pol-
4 I describe the details of the policy in the next section
4
icy treatment measured at the individual level shows that a $1000 increase in the CCTC increases
the labor force participation rate by three percentage points. Incorporating individual fixed effects
reduces the magnitude of the treatment effect to close to two percentage points.
However, the individual CCTC treatment variable involves individual information, which
introduces endogeneity. In addition, the measurement of the individual CCTC treatment variable is
measured at the maximum level for each woman, which suffers from measurement error. Moreover,
there could be other time-varying factors that are omitted from the estimation. To deal with these
issues, I use the state-level CCTC treatment variable as the instrumental variable for the individual
CCTC treatment variable. The results from using the instrumental variables (IV) estimation show
that: a $1000 increase in the CCTC increases maternal labor force participation rate by six percent-
age points. The effects are more pronounced in married mothers than in single mothers. Conditional
on being in the labor market, a $1000 increase in the CCTC increases annual work hours by 104
hours. The effects are also mainly driven by married mothers.
In the literature, there is a large variation in the estimated labor supply responsiveness of
women. Hausman (1985) and Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) summarize the wide-ranged empirical
results of the responsiveness of female labor supply in their survey papers. In the United States
context, Hausman and Ruud (1984) use the 1976 wave of the PSID to estimate a joint labor supply
responding to federal and state tax schedules and find an elasticity of wives’ labor supply to be 0.76.
Triest (1990) uses the 1983 wave of the PSID to estimate an elasticit of wives’ labor supply to be 0.97.
Rosen (1976) uses data from the 1967 National Longitudinal Survey of Mature and Young Women
to examine the labor supply decisions of married women. He estimates the elasticity of annual work
hours to be 2.3. In the British context, Arrufat and Zabalza (1986) uses British General Household
Survey 1974 and estimate an elasticity of labor supply for married women to be 2.03. And Blundell,
Costa Dias, et al. (2016) use the British Household Panel Survey to estimate an elasticity of female
labor supply to be 0.67. In this study, the basic difference-in-differences estimation results can be
transferred into a back-of-the-envelope calculation of an elasticity of female labor supply that is close
to 0.6. And the estimation results using IV estimation can be transferred to an elasticity of labor
supply that is 1.1 for all mothers with CCTC eligible children and 1.6 for married mothers, which
are close to the upper bound of the estimates in the literature.
One major policy that may affect the identification is the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).
To address the possible confounding effect of the EITC, I use the legislative history of the EITC
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to construct a state-level EITC treatment variable and an individual EITC treatment variable in
the similar way as I construct the CCTC treatment variables. I control for the EITC in all the
estimations, and find that including the EITC does not influence the effects of the CCTC on maternal
labor supply, though the EITC does have an independent impact on the labor supply of women with
young children. However, in contrast to the CCTC, the effect of the EITC is more pronounced in
single mothers rather than married mothers. The results for the effect of the EITC are consistent
with Scholz (1996), Hotz et al. (2003), and Bastian (Forthcoming).
The main contribution of this paper is that I explore the causal effects of the CCTC on
maternal labor supply. This study also contributes to the literature by providing new empirical
evidence for the relationship between child care cost and maternal labor supply. Researchers may
find the CCTC legislative information documented in this study to be useful in studying child care
related topics. This paper is also the first to evaluate the CCTC and the EITC within the same
framework.
1.2 Institutional Background
In 1976, the United States federal government added a subsection to the Internal Revenue
Code — “Expenses for household and dependent care services necessary for gainful employment
(Title 26 U.S.C.§ 21).” It replaced a tax deduction for child care expenses with a tax credit.
According to the law, parents can claim a tax credit against their federal income tax liabilities
to go toward the child care expenses necessary for them to work. The CCTC uses the existing
tax system without adding extra services or establishing new institutions, as do many subsidy or
welfare programs. The CCTC merely involves extra administrative costs during the tax season and
is relatively easy for the potential benefit recipients to comprehend. To participate in the program,
a taxpayer only needs to provide the necessary tax forms and payment proof.
Compared to many subsidy or welfare programs that mainly aim at low-income or single-
parent families, the CCTC covers a broad population. At the federal level, the CCTC does not
phase out entirely as family income increases. However, the federal CCTC is limited to the tax
liability, i.e., it is non-refundable. If a taxpayer only has a small level of tax liability, she cannot
get many benefits even if she incurs a large amount of child care expenses. As a result, low-income
or single-parent families do not receive as many benefits as middle-income or high-income families
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(Ackerman et al., 2016). Though the CCTC is not refundable at the federal level, some states do
allow refunds. In this case, when the state CCTC is higher than the state tax liability, the taxpayers
can get a refund.5
It is essential to clarify the details of the CCTC calculation. I do so by first describing the
details of the current federal CCTC calculation. As of 2015, families with children under thirteen
are potentially eligible for the federal CCTC.6 The actual tax credit is the product of the following
two elements: child care expenses used to calculate the tax credit and an applicable rate decreasing
with family adjusted gross income (AGI). The equation used to calculate the federal CCTC is
CCTCfederal = Child care expenses× applicable rate. (1.1)
As of 2015, the highest applicable rate is 35% for a family with AGI less than $15,000. The rate
reduces by one percentage point per $2000 of extra AGI, from the highest rates at 35% for a family
with AGI under $15,000 to the lowest rates of 20% for a family with AGI higher than $43,000.
The measure of the expenses used to calculate the credit is complicated. First, the expenses
are bound by an upper limit of $3000 for families with one eligible child or $6000 for families with
two or more eligible children. Second, the expenses are subject to the actual child care expenses
paid by the parents for the eligible children in a tax year. Third, the expenses are no more than the
earned income of the parent if single, or the smaller of the earned income of the parents if married.
The smallest among the three items is the reference for the child care expenses. Table 1.1 shows
the applicable rate and the maximum allowable federal CCTC for families with different AGIs and
number of eligible children.
Figure 1.2 illustrates the legislative history of the federal CCTC. At first, the 1976 legislation
allowed families to claim 20% of the child care expenses up to $2000 for one child or $4000 for two
or more children regardless of the family income. The 1982 legislation increased the upper bound
of expenses to $2400 for one or $4800 for two or more eligible children and made the applicable
rate a sliding scheme reducing from 30% to 20%. The 1989 legislation lowered the eligible age from
under fifteen years old to under thirteen years old. The 2003 legislation increased the upper bound
of the expenses to current $3000 for one or $6000 for two or more eligible children and increased the
5 Among the twenty-five states with the CCTC, Alaska, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine,
Minnesota, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, and Vermont have allowed a refundable CCTC at least for one year.
6 Except for young children, eligible individuals include dependent(s) physically or mentally incapable of caring
for him or herself. Most states follow the definition of eligible individuals in the federal CCTC.
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highest applicable rate to the current 35%.
Following the federal government, many states adopted similar policies allowing taxpayers
to claim a tax credit against their state income tax for the same child care expenses. As of 2015,
twenty-four states and Washington D.C. offered a state CCTC.7 Another four states offered a tax
deductions for child care expenses.8 Figure 1.3 exhibits the states with the CCTC and child care
tax deductions. Although child care tax deductions also provide some incentive for mothers to join
the labor market, their effects are not as direct as a tax credit. In this study, I put these four states
that provide only a tax deduction in the control group rather than the treatment group.
There are two sources of variation in the state-level CCTC. First, each of the twenty-five
states has its own CCTC legislative history. Second, most states link their state CCTC to the federal
CCTC. When the federal government makes adjustments to the policy, the state-level CCTC changes
accordingly. States usually set a match-up rate as a proportion of the federal CCTC. The linkage
with the federal CCTC makes the screening and calculation easier. In most states, the equation
used to calculate the state CCTC is
CCTCstate = CCTCfederal × state match-up rate. (1.2)
Some states set a uniform match-up rate regardless of the family income, for example, Georgia allows
all eligible taxpayers to claim a state CCTC equal to 30% of the federal CCTC.9 Some other states
however, specify different match-up rates according to the family income. There are also cases that
states link their state CCTC with the child care expenses used to calculate the federal CCTC. There
are also some other states that do not link their state CCTC to the federal CCTC. I describe the
details of the CCTC calculation in each state in Appendix C. The state CCTC provides an extra
subsidy in addition to the federal CCTC.
One contribution of this paper is that I collect and organize the legislative history of the
federal and state CCTC from 1976 to 2015. I look up the federal and state statutes and in some
cases, use references from various sources.10 I document the enactments, amendments (in some
cases repeals), and the specific regulation of eligibility, phasing-out rate, and other aspects of the
7 Among these 25 states, Kansas repealed its CCTC in 2013; North Carolina repealed its CCTC in 2014; Alaska
does not have a state income tax, but it provides a refundable “tax credit” to eligible families.
8 Idaho, Massachusetts, Montana, and Virginia are the four states with a child care tax deduction policy.
9 For example, a two-child family in Georgia with AGI $14,000 can claim $630 ($2, 100× 30% = $630) of the state
CCTC if the earning of any parent is higher than $6000.
10 In Appendix C I describe the details of the sources of this information.
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legislation. Using the detailed legislative information, I construct a comprehensive data set that
allows me to estimate the effects of the CCTC on maternal labor supply thoroughly and rigorously.
In Appendix A, I describe the details of the federal CCTC; in Appendices B and C, I describe the
details of the state-level CCTC.
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is another subsidy policy that mainly assistants
low-income families. In order to deal with the potential confounding effect of the EITC, I collect
the legislative history of the federal EITC and adopt the state EITC history documented by Shapiro
(2019) from the National Bureau of Economic Research. I discuss the details of the information
used to calculate the EITC in Appendix D and Appendix E.
1.3 Theoretical Framework for the Effect of the CCTC on
the Budget Constraint
CCTC changes the budget constraint faced by women with young children. To illustrate
the effects of the CCTC (and the EITC) on a woman’s budget constraint, I create the following
scenario. Imagine a married woman has two children under thirteen years old. Her husband works
full-time and has an annual income of $30,000.11 The income and time allocation of the husband
are exogenous. The woman has 2000 hours that she can allocate between labor supply and home
production (or child care).12 If she works, she earns $15 per hour. At the same time, once she starts
to work, she pays a fixed number of $6000 per year for the child care expenses of her two children.
In Figure 1.4, the horizontal axis represents the hours allocated on home production, the opposite
of which is then the hours of labor supply; the vertical axis is the family income under different tax
calculations. The tax schedule used here is reflective of the federal income tax code in the 2018 tax
year.
The family is potentially eligible for the CCTC (if the woman starts to work and has an
earned income) and the EITC. Since the EITC is refundable and the CCTC is not, the EITC comes
in the budget constraint first, even when the woman is not working. If this woman does not work,
she does not pay for child care. The height of the dot on the vertical 2000-home-production-hour
11 I choose $30,000 because if the wife works at least part-time, the family’s income reaches the median family
income in the United States.
12 I choose 2000 hours because it is the typical annual work hours for a full-time worker. So a woman is most likely
to choose annual work hours between 0 to 2000.
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line represents the family income when the wife does not work. This income includes a refund from
the EITC.
Once she starts to work, she needs to pay $6000 a year for child care services. The solid line
shows the relationship between the total family income after paying for child care services and after
federal income taxes according to the time allocation of the woman. The dashed line in Figure 1.4
represents the family income after paying for child care services and after federal income taxes and
the EITC. The distance between the solid line and the dashed line decreases as the mother supplies
more work hours and the family has a higher income. The EITC totally phases out gradually.
The CCTC is not refundable. It comes in the budget constraint when the family incurs a
tax liability. With the presence of the EITC, the CCTC kicks in only when the tax liability exceeds
the EITC. The dotted line in Figure 1.4 represents the family income after paying for child care
services and after federal taxes, the EITC, and the CCTC according to the time allocation of the
woman. When the CCTC comes in the budget constraint, it is first bound by the actual tax liability.
When the tax liability is low, the difference between the dotted line and the dashed line is small.
The benefit of the CCTC increases when the family has more tax liability. When the mother’s
work hours are low and her income is lower than $6000 a year, the CCTC calculation is limited to
the mother’s earned income. When the mother works more hours and earns more than $6000, the
calculation of the CCTC is bound by the upper limit of $6000. At the same time, the applicable
rate decreases as family income increases, and the distance between the dotted line and dashed line
decreases but stays constant when the applicable rate reaches its lowest 20%.
For households living in states with state income taxes and a state-level CCTC, the state
income taxes move the dotted budget line downward and the state-level CCTC moves the budget
line upward again. A woman maximizes her utility by choosing whether to work and how many
hours to work.13 Without the CCTC, it is possible that the woman finds it is optimal for her to
stay out of the labor market. However, She is more likely to work when her choice set is expanded
by the existence of the CCTC. Her optimal time allocation can jump from the corner solution of
not working to a tangent point or a kinked point with certain amount of work hours. That said, if
conditional on being in the labor market, the effects of the CCTC and the EITC on work hours are
ambiguous.
13 There could exist additional fixed costs for her to join the labor market (Cogan, 1980). The fixed costs of joining
the labor market can reflect the skill or the preference of the woman, or both. These costs will further move the
budget constraint downward.
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1.4 Empirical Strategies Used to Estimate the Effects of the
CCTC on Maternal Labor Supply
The CCTC changes the incentive faced by women with young children. In Appendix F, I
describe a simple model for the utility maximization problem faced by a mother. The labor supply of
a mother is a function of the child care cost and other factors. In this section, I propose to estimate
a reduced form model denoted by
Yist = α0 + α1CCTCist + α2Aist + κs + ρt + ωi + νist, (1.3)
where Yist is the dependent variable representing the labor supply of a woman. The independent
variable CCTCist denotes the CCTC received by mother i in the state s and year t. The covari-
ate Aist includes individual characteristics: age, age squared, marital status, education, husband’s
income (for married women), number of children, and age of the youngest child. Other variables
on the right hand side are κs, ρt, and ωi, which represent state, year, and individual fixed effects,
respectively, and νist is the disturbance term.
The federal CCTC is more generous compared to most state-level CCTCs. However, con-
ditional on husband’s income, number of children and a woman’s potential earning, families receive
the same treatment from the federal CCTC in a given year. As a result, the effect of the federal
CCTC is absorbed by the year fixed effects. However, the state-level CCTC variation generates a
treatment group and a control group; they are the primary sources of identification.
As specified above, the actual CCTC is endogenous. First, it is a joint decision to work
more hours and to purchase more child care services.14 Second, the mother’s income and purchased
child care affect the expenses used to calculate the credit. Moreover, the mother’s labor supply af-
fects family income, and family income further determines the applicable rate used to calculate the
federal and some state-level CCTCs. I deal with this endogeneity issue by proposing the following
empirical strategies. I first use the variation of the state CCTC adoption and adjustment in gen-
erosity to construct a state-level CCTC treatment variable and perform a differences-in-differences
analysis with treatment intensity. I then further exploit the federal and state CCTC regulations
14 In reality, families can use child care from other family members or friends, but unpaid informal care does not
count in claiming the CCTC.
11
on individual eligibility and generosity to construct an individual CCTC treatment variable and
perform a differences-in-differences with the individual-specific CCTC treatment intensity. Finally,
I use the state-level CCTC treatment variable as an instrument for the individual CCTC treatment
variable. By applying these strategies, I explore the causal relationship between the CCTC and
maternal labor supply.
1.4.1 State-level CCTC Variation
First, the state CCTC varies in time of enactments. The earliest group of states enacted
their state CCTC between 1976 and 1977, almost immediately after the enactment of the federal
CCTC.15 Georgia is the most recent state to adopt the policy, creating its own CCTC in 2006
(restricting the cases to before 2016). The variation in the timing of the CCTC enactment provides
the first opportunity for identification. The implementation of a state CCTC provides additional
incentives for women to enter the labor force. All other things equal, women with CCTC eligible
children living in states that provide CCTC are more likely to participate in the labor market
compared to women living in states that do not provide CCTC.
Among states offering a CCTC, some states are more generous than others. A more generous
state CCTC has a different impact when compared to a less generous state CCTC. It is difficult to
capture the effects of the CCTC by indicating only the existence of the state CCTC. The variation
in state CCTC generosity can be reflected by the state match-up rate to the federal CCTC. For
example, New York matches the federal CCTC to levels as high as 110% in some years. It means
that if a New York family claims $1000 of the federal CCTC, the family could claim up to $1100 of
the state CCTC if the family’s income falls in a certain income bracket. On the other hand, Iowa
matched the federal CCTC by as low as 5% when it first adopted its state CCTC.
In addition to cross-sectional variation across states, the CCTC vary differently over time.
Some states seldom change their CCTC regulations, while others adjust their CCTC regulations
frequently. The variation in the generosity of the policy across states and over time provides another
opportunity for identification. A more generous state CCTC provides more incentive for women to
join the labor market. All other things equal, women with CCTC eligible children living in a state or
time period offering a more generous CCTC are more likely to join the labor market when compared
15 These states include Arkansas, California, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Vermont, and Washington D.C.
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with women living in a state or time period offering a less generous CCTC.
As specified above, the CCTC regulation is a function of a woman’s own labor supply and
some other individual characteristics. To disentangle the endogeneity issue, I construct a state-level
CCTC treatment variable using the maximum level of the state CCTC. It is the product of the
maximum federal CCTC in a given year and the highest match-up rate of a state in the same year.
Therefore, I construct a panel dataset for the state-level CCTC treatment variable by assigning the
same treatment to all women in a state-year cell. The assumption used here is that states with a
higher value of the state-level CCTC measured at the maximum level are more generous in offering
the CCTC.
Using the state-level CCTC treatment variation, I explore the effect of the CCTC on labor
supply by using a differences-in-differences method. The empirical model is
Yist = β0 + β1maxCCTCst + β2Xist + β3maxEITCst + λs + δt + ξi + εist, (1.4)
where Yist is the dependent variable representing the labor supply of a woman. It can represent
whether a woman i in state s and year t is in the labor market; or it can represent her annual work
hours. The independent variable maxCCTCst denotes the maximum state-level CCTC allowed in
the state s and year t. The independent variable Xist includes individual characteristics: age, age
squared, marital status, education, husband’s income (for married women), number of children, and
age of the youngest child. The covariate maxEITCst denotes the maximum state-level EITC in
state s and year t. Other variables on the right hand side are λs, δt, and ξi, which represent state,
year, and individual fixed effects, respectively; and εist is the disturbance term.
The state and year fixed effects absorb the common factors that affect the labor supply of
every woman in a year or a state; the individual fixed effects can absorb the unobserved heterogeneity
in productivity or preference towards work, or both. With the other controls, β1 is the coefficient of
interest that reflects the effects of the state-level CCTC treatment variable on maternal labor supply.
However, the baseline differences-in-differences strategy suffers from the common challenge of the
differences-in-differences method. There could exist some factors that affect the time of the CCTC
adoption or adjustment in generosity, and therefore affect the maternal labor supply at the same time.
The local economy or social stigma towards working women are a couple of examples. Moreover,
the basic differences-in-differences strategy requires that the female labor supply in different states
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follows a common trend before the introduction of the state CCTC.
Adding another source of variation within a state-year cell to perform a triple-differences
estimation is a solution to this issue (Angrist and Pischke, 2008; Goodman-Bacon, 2018). Though
the state-level CCTC treatment is the same for all the individuals in a state-year cell, it has a different
impact on different demographic groups. If the enactment and adjustment in the generosity of the
state CCTC affect the female labor supply, they only do so for women with CCTC eligible children.
Women without children and women whose children are above the age of eligibility provide placebo
tests and a common trend. If the state-level CCTC treatment variable only affects the labor supply
of women with eligible children but has no effect on women without eligible children, it is evident
that the effects of the CCTC on female labor supply are not a reflection of a common trend. The
emplirical model for the triple-differences analysis is
Yist = π0 + π1 maxCCTCst + π2 eligibleist + π3 maxCCTCst · eligibleist
+ π4 Xist + π5 Xist · eligibleist + +π6 EITCst + π7 EITCst · eligibleist
+ λs + π8 λs · eligibleist + δt + π9 δt · eligibleist + ξi + εist,
(1.5)
where eligibleist is a dummy variable indicating that individual i has at least one CCTC eligible
child in state s and year t. Such a triple-differences strategy assuages some doubts on the baseline
differences-in-differences method.
1.4.2 Individual CCTC Variation
The state-level CCTC treatment variable is a coarse proxy for the CCTC treatment. It
does not incorporate the multi-dimensional variation of the CCTC regulations in some states. Many
states have precise regulations on the eligibility of the state CCTC and specify such eligibility by
setting a phase-out scheme according to family income (or in some cases, an income cap), and
such regulations frequently change over time. As a result, the maximum state-level CCTC is not
relevant to most of the families living in the states where the CCTC eligibility and generosity vary
significantly with income. It is appropriate to construct a treatment variable that is relevant to each
woman according to her observable characteristics. Except for the income of the woman, which is
endogenous, the number of eligible children and the husband’s income (for married women) are the
most critical factors that decide the state CCTC treatment for a particular woman. I construct an
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“individual CCTC” treatment variable to reflect the policy faced by each woman. I propose to use
the maximum CCTC a woman can claim from a state to represent the treatment intensity of a state
CCTC.
The empirical model using the individual CCTC treatment variation is
Yist = γ0 + γ1 maxCCTCist + γ2 Zist + γ3 maxEITCist + ζs + ηt + θi + µist. (1.6)
The main difference from the empirical model in the last subsection is that maxCCTCist denotes the
maximum CCTC for a woman i in the state s and year t. Here, Zist controls for the same individual
characteristics and includes the number of eligible children because it is an element that both decides
the treatment intensity as well as the labor supply. The covariate maxEITCist represents the
maximum individual ETIC that is applicable to woman i in state s and year t. Other variables
on the right hand side are ζs, ηt, and θi, which represent state, year, and individual fixed effects,
respectively; and µist is the disturbance term.
Incorporating individual information related to the CCTC eligibility provides more sources
of identification. Apart from comparing the differences in the labor supply caused by the resident
state or time with the different state CCTC policy intensity, I can compare the effects of the CCTC
on labor supply for groups that are generated by the cut-off limit of husband’s income and the
number of CCTC eligible children. The coefficient γ1 is the main coefficent of interest reflecting the
effect of the individual CCTC treatment variable on maternal labor supply.
The calculation of the individual CCTC treatment variable follows the function
maxCCTCist = fst(Ei, Ni), (1.7)
where Ei and Ni represent the husband’s income and number of CCTC eligible children, respectively.
The function fst(·, ·) represents the state CCTC regulation used to calculate the credit in state s
and year t. The construction of the individual CCTC treatment variable starts from the individual
federal CCTC. A woman realizes the maximum federal CCTC when she earns a certain amount of
annual income and spends enough on child care services to hit the upper bound of the expenses.
The break-even point of the woman’s earnings, child care expenses, and the upper bound of $3000
or $6000 guarantees the woman with the maximum federal CCTC. I first use the break-even point
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to calculate the maximum federal CCTC for each woman. Using this individual federal CCTC, I
then calculate the individual maximum state CCTC by multiplying individual federal CCTC with
the match-up rate specified by a state (according to husband’s income).
In reality, a woman makes her labor supply decision without considering the maximization of
the CCTC. However, in this complicated situation, the maximum individual CCTC treatment vari-
able makes it convenient to compare the treatment intensity across individuals. Some assumptions
are necessary for the break-even point to land on the budget constraint. When child care expenses
impose a fixed cost for a woman to join the labor market and if the fixed cost of child care is close
to the upper bound of $3000 or $6000, the break-even point is on the budget constraint. Otherwise,
this break-even point may not be a feasible choice under other child care payment schemes.
The individual CCTC treatment variable may not be a good policy proxy for women who
are more likely to supply a high level of hours and with a high potential labor income, because the
total family income with or without the wife’s income would be quite different. In this case, the
optimal time allocation point is far away from the point on the budget constraint used to construct
the treatment variable. In addition, if the state CCTC phases out significantly with family income,
the treatment variable is not accurate for them. That said, in terms of measuring the extensive
margin,i.e., whether work or not, it is not a problem. Women who have a high earning ability are
also more likely to be in the labor market regardless of the existence of the CCTC. Therefore, they
do not contribute to the identification. Instead, the marginal women who are indifferent between
working or staying at home contribute to the identification the most. When these women begin
to join the labor market, it is plausible that they are less likely to participate in the labor market
intensively. As a result, the optimal time allocation is not too distant from the break-even point on
the budget constraint used to construct the individual CCTC treatment variable. A woman on the
margin can receive the maximum CCTC by working part-time and paying for child care. Therefore,
it is acceptable to define the individual CCTC treatment variable based on these assumptions and
coding criteria.
Introducing detailed individual characteristics makes the treatment more relevant for each
woman, but it also brings in endogeneity. There is also the assumption that the husband’s income
are exogenous for married women. Under this assumption, a woman first finds her best-matched
husband in the marriage market, then the characteristics of the husband (e.g., earning ability and
time arrangement in the family) are exogenous. Taking the husband’s income as exogenous is an
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assumption adopted by Michalopoulos et al. (1992), Van der Klaauw (1996), and Francesconi (2002).
Mroz (1987) also provides some evidence for this argument.
The number of children or number of CCTC eligible children may be endogenous, too.
However, a more generous state CCTC has little effect on the fertility decisions. Most states follow
the federal CCTC regulation and only make the distinction for the number of eligible children
between one and two (two includes more than two CCTC eligible children). As a result, an additional
child cannot contribute to more tax credit if the family already has two eligible children. The other
doubt would be that a family can extend the time of childbearing to take advantage of a longer
eligibility period, but the chance that it could be a concern is also small.16
There could be other issues involved in the individual CCTC treatment variable. Even
controlling for husband’s income, number of children, and the individual fixed effects, there could be
other time-varying factors that are omitted. For example, women with the same number of eligible
children but with different age structure of the children may face quite different time constraints. Or
for example, a woman may prefer more children after she had her first one. In this case, she will be
less likely to join the labor market and at the same time receive higher individual CCTC treatment.
As a result, the treatment effect is attenuated. The influence from the original family may also
affect a woman’s fertility and labor supply decision. Some women’s fertility decisions and timing
may be related to the availability of the help they expect to receive from their families. And this
information is relatively hard to control for. Also, since the individual CCTC treatment variable is
defined at the maximum level, it is a proxy for the policy rather than the exact state CCTC amount
one can receive. As a result, there is a measurement error problem as well. My proposal for dealing
with these issues is to use the state-level CCTC treatment variable as the instrumental variable for
the individual CCTC treatment variable.
The state-level CCTC treatment variable reflects the generosity of a state in providing
CCTC in general. It is the maximum CCTC a state allows. To claim the exact amount of the
maximum CCTC, a family must have two or more CCTC eligible children, fall in the lowest income
bracket (if the state specifies its match-up rate for different income brackets), and also pay for child
care expenses to the upper bound at the same time. Families with only one eligible child never get
the maximum state CCTC. The state-level CCTC is not relevant for families that fall into higher
16 I estimate the effects of the state CCTC on the number of children and number of eligible children and find no
evidence that the fertility is associated with the treatment of the CCTC.
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income brackets either. As a result, it is only applicable to a small portion of the population. For
the majority of the population, it meets the exclusion restriction for a valid IV.
The state-level CCTC treatment variable has an impact on the labor supply only through
its association with the individual CCTC treatment variable. In general, the state-level CCTC
treatment variable is positively associated with the individual CCTC treatment variable. In some
cases, a state adjust the match-up rates making no distinction across income levels; in these cases,
the individual CCTC treatment variable always moves in the same direction as the state-level CCTC
treatment variable. However, in some cases, when the CCTC policy is adjusted, a state may make
it more generous to some income groups (usually the low-income families) but less generous or even
unavailable for some other groups (usually the high-income families). In these cases, the state-
level CCTC and the individual CCTC may move in opposite directions for high-income families.
Such regulations create “defiers” in the population. The existence of the defiers invalidates the IV
method. However, the defiers only consist of a small fraction of the population, and they are more
likely to be women whose husband has a high annual income. To deal with the problem caused
by the existence of the defiers, I restrict my sample used to perform the IV analysis by dropping
married women whose husband earns more than $50,000 every year.17 With the sample restriction,
the state-level CCTC treatment variable meets both the relevance requirement and the monotonicity
requirement. Based on the above argument, the state-level CCTC treatment variable is a valid IV
for the individual CCTC treatment variable.
1.5 Data Used to Construct the Variables
The samples used in this paper are from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The
PSID consists of 4,802 households and 18,233 individuals in the first wave of the survey in 1968.
The sample households and the extended households were followed up annually from 1968 to 1997,
and biennially from 1997 to the present.18
The PSID survey collects information at the household level. Relatively abundant economic
and demographic information about the household head and the spouse (if there is one) is collected.
If other family members do not form a new family unit, their information is not as abundant. I
17 This income is inflation-adjusted and $50,000 is approximately the median income for husbands in my sample
18 Among the 4,802 original households, 2,930 households are from a nationally representative sample (Survey
Research Center at University of Michigan or SRC sample), and the other 1,872 are from a low-income household
sample (Survey of Economic Opportunity or SEO sample).
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restrict my sample to women aged 20 to 55 who are either the wife of the household head or the head
of a household during the survey years of 1968-2015. Although women with at least one child under
the eligible age of the CCTC are the main focus, I include women with no children and women with
children above the eligible age to perform placebo tests.
The PSID dataset is suitable for this research because it covers a time range that provides
pre-treatment and post-treatment periods to carry out the differences-in-differences method. The
information about the labor market and family structure is useful for examining the effects of the
CCTC on labor supply decisions. I include woman with CCTC eligible children from all 50 U.S.
states and Washington D.C. I also use the PSID Childbirth and Adoption History to calculate the
number of CCTC eligible children in a household in a given year. The restriction of the birth history
data is that it is only available for up to five children. Therefore, I restrict my sample to women
who have less than six children in their life time. Applying the sample selection criteria, I construct
an individual-level panel data set.
Table 1.2 reports the summary statistics for the sample by marital status. LFP is a dummy
variable denoting whether a woman is or is not in the labor market. I assign one to the variable if
someone reports positive work hours; I assign zero to the variable if someone reports zero working
hours. Using this criteria, I obtain a consistent measurement for the labor force participation through
out the survey years. The LFP for married women is 65%, and the LFP for single women is 78.9%.
On average the married women work 1,042 hours every year and the single women work 1,114 hours.
Conditional on being in the labor market, the number of annual work hours is 1,420 and 1,528 for
married and single women respectively. On average the married women are 31.8 years old, while the
single women are 30.6 years old. The married women have 12.5 years of education, which is half a
year more than the single mothers. For married women, the average husband’s annual income (in
2015 dollars) is $52,636 (conditional on the husband having income). The average number of children
is around 2.1 for both groups. The racial composition is quite different. The single women are more
likely to be black compared with married mothers. Figure 1.5 shows the binned scatter plot of the
labor force participation rates and ages of the youngest child by states or years with or without the
state-level CCTC. The vertical dashed line represents the cut-off age of the CCTC eligibility since
1989, and the samples are restricted to between 1989 to 2015. For women whose youngest child is 8
to 12 years old, the labor force participation rate in the states or years that provide state CCTC is
on average higher than that of the states or years that do not provide state CCTC. Right after the
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cut-off age, the labor force participation rates of the two groups converge together. Figure 1.6 shows
the distribution of the state-level CCTC treatment variable for the sample conditional on positive
values, and Figure 1.7 shows the distribution of the individual CCTC treatment variable. Figure 1.8
shows the correlation between the state-level CCTC treatment variable and the individual CCTC
treatment variable. Table A4 in Appendix G also shows the summary statistics for samples used to
perform the IV estimation. They are similar to the main samples except for having lower husbands’
incomes.
1.6 Estimation Results
I apply the empirical strategies described in section 4, and I look at the effects of the CCTC
on the labor force participation rate and the annual work hours (conditional on being in the labor
market). This section reports the estimation results.
1.6.1 Estimation Results Using the State-level CCTC Treatment Variable
Using the state-level CCTC treatment variable described above, I run differences-in-differences
estimations with treatment intensity. I first apply the method to the labor force participation rates,
and Table 1.3 shows the results. The main independent variable of interest is the state-level CCTC.
All specifications control for the state-level EITC. The covariates are years of education, age, age
squared, marital status (except for column 3 and column 4), husband’s annual income (except for
column 4), number of children (except for column 6), age of the youngest child (except for column
6), and state and year fixed effects. Column 1 shows results for all the samples using pooled ordinary
least squares (OLS) estimation. The coefficient of the state-level CCTC treatment variable is 3.28,
which means that on average, a $1000 increase in state-level CCTC, measured at the maximum
level, increases the maternal labor force participation rate by 3.28 percentage points. 19
Column 2 shows the results from panel regression controlling for individual fixed effects.
The coefficient of the state-level CCTC variable is smaller compared to the pooled OLS result in
column 1 but still statistically significant. Column 3 demonstrates the results for the sub-sample of
married women while column 4 shows the results for single women. Comparing the two, the effect
19 The treatment unit of the CCTC (and EITC) is normalized to $1000 because the magnitude of $1000 is around
the mean value of state-level CCTC treatment variable. This magnitude is about 1.5 standard deviation of the state-
level CCTC treatment variable. The individual CCTC treatment variable has a smaller mean value, but I still use
the same unit of $1000 to be consistent with state-level treatment variable.
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of CCTC is more pronounced in married women. Column 5 and column 6 provide placebo tests
by applying the CCTC treatment on groups of women without CCTC eligible children. Column
5 shows that the state-level CCTC treatment variable does not affect the labor force participation
of women whose children are too old to be eligible for the CCTC, and column 6 shows that the
state-level CCTC treatment does not affect the labor supply of women who have no children. The
placebo tests provide convincing evidence that the effect of the CCTC is not merely a reflection of a
common trend. In column 7, I pool all the sample together and run a triple-differences estimation as
specified in equation (1.5). Column 7 reports the estimation result for the coefficient π3 in equation
(1.5), which represents the treatment effect of the state-level CCTC on women with at least one
CCTC eligible child. It means that a $1000 increase in CCTC increases the labor force participation
rate by 1.97 percentage points.
At the same time, the state-level EITC significantly affects the labor force participation
rates of women with young children. However, the EITC only affects labor force participation of
single women, not married women. The results provide evidence that the CCTC and the EITC work
through different channels.
I then apply the same method to estimate the effect of the state-level CCTC on annual work
hours conditional on already being in the labor market, the results of which are reported in Table
1.4.20 With the same controls as in Table 1.3, column 1 of Table 1.4 shows that: a $1000 increase in
CCTC increases annual work hours by 34. Column 2 adds control for individual fixed effects, and
the effect of the CCTC is smaller and not significantly different from zero. Column 3 and column 4
shows the sub-groups by marital status. Column 5 and column 6 show the results for women who
have no eligible children. Column 7 shows the result using triple-differences method. The EITC has
no significant effects on work hours in all specifications. After controlling for individual fixed effects,
the coefficients for the state-level CCTC are not statistically different from zero.
1.6.2 Estimation Results Using the Individual CCTC Treatment Variable
This subsection reports the estimation results using the individual CCTC treatment variable.
I first apply the method to examine the effect on labor force participation rates, and Table 1.5 shows
the results. The controls are the same with those in the last subsection except that the control for
20 I restrict the work hours between 0 and 3000. In the sample, 3000 hours per year is at the 99th percentile among
positive hours.
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the EITC is at the individual level. Additionally, I include a control for the number of the CCTC
eligible children because it is a factor used to calculate the individual CCTC treatment variable.
Column 1 of Table 1.5 shows the results for the basic pooled OLS estimation. The coefficient of the
CCTC means that: a $1000 increase in the state CCTC, measured at the individual maximum level,
increases labor force participation rate by 2.79 percentage points. Column 2 controls for individual
fixed effects and uses the panel regression method. With individual fixed effects, the coefficient of
the CCTC treatment is relatively smaller, reflecting that the individual fixed effects absorb too much
variation.
As discussed in the last section, the individual CCTC treatment variable is more relevant
to the condition of each woman, but it also introduces endogeneity. The state-level CCTC and the
state-level EITC treatment variables are exogenous and can work as the instrumental variables for
the individual CCTC and the individual EITC treatment variables. Column 3 of Table 1.5 reports
results for instrumental variable estimation, it shows that the CCTC significantly increases the labor
force participation of mothers. A $1000 increase in CCTC increases the labor force participation rate
by 6.35 percentage points. The coefficient of the IV estimation is larger than the coefficients from
using OLS and panel regression, which reflects the OLS estimates using individual CCTC variation
are attenuated. Column 4 and column 5 show the results according to marital status. The disparity
of the effects across marital status is consistent with results derived by using the state-level CCTC
treatment. The EITC has a small effect on the labor force participation of the mothers, and it
mainly affects single mothers.
Table 1.6 reports the first stage estimates of the IV regression. It shows that the state-level
CCTC is a good predictor of the individual CCTC, and the state-level EITC treatment variable is a
good predictor of the individual EITC treatment variables. However, the state-level CCTC does not
account for the variation of the individual EITC; neither does the state-level EITC account for the
variation of the individual CCTC. Overall, the state-level CCTC and EITC pass weak instrument
tests.
I then apply the same method on the annual work hours (conditional on already being in the
labor market). The results in column 1 and column 2 of Table 1.7 show that the individual CCTC
treatment has little effect under OLS estimations. However, the IV estimation results in column 3
show that CCTC significantly increases annual work hours. A $1000 increase in CCTC increases the
annual working hours by 103.8 hours. Such an increase equals to two and a half weeks of full-time
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work. Further examining the effects by marital status, I find that the effects are particularly large
for married mothers. For most specifications in Table 1.7, the EITC does not significantly affect the
work hours.
1.7 Discussion
The CCTC significantly increases the labor supply of women with CCTC eligible children,
but different demographic groups may have different responses given the different constraints faced
by different women. In this section, I first interpret the heterogeneity of the estimation results and
discuss the mechanisms behind them as well as the potential confounding policies.
1.7.1 Heterogeneity
In the literature, there is a large range of estimates as to the responsiveness of female labor
force participation. Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) summarize the wide-ranged empirical results
of the responsiveness of female labor supply in their surveys. For the United States context, the
estimated elasticities of labor force participation for married women range from 0.76 (Hausman and
Ruud, 1984) to 0.97 (Triest, 1990). Other research such as Rosen (1976), estimates the elasticity of
annual work hours for married women to be 2.3. The estimated elasticities for married women under
British context varies from 0.67 (Blundell, Costa Dias, et al., 2016) to 2.03 (Arrufat and Zabalza,
1986). The results from this study can be transferred into a back-of-the-envelope calculation of the
labor supply elasticity to be 1.1 for all women and 1.6 for married women. These results are close
to the upper bound in the literature.
The labor force participation responsiveness to the CCTC for single mothers are smaller
than that of the married mothers. Also, the results derived from using instrumental variables show
that for single mothers the responsiveness to the CCTC is very close to that of the EITC. In the
literature, the range of estimation of labor supply responsiveness for single women is relatively
narrow. The magnitude of the labor force participation responsiveness of single mothers in this
study is comparable to the results of Eissa and Liebman (1996), who find that the participation
elasticity for single mothers with lower level of education is approximately 0.6.
Children of different ages impose different time constraints on mothers. I divide the female
samples with CCTC eligible children into groups according to the age of the youngest child. I run
23
the pooled OLS estimation on the labor force participation rates for each group, and the results
are shown in Figure 1.9. The horizontal axis represents the age groups of the youngest child. The
vertical axis is in terms of the labor force participation rate. The height of the black dots represents
the values of the regression coefficients for the state-level CCTC treatment variable with a $1000
increase in the state-level CCTC treatment variable. The segments that go through the dots are the
95% confidence intervals. Figure 1.9 shows that women whose youngest child is between 10-12 years
old are most responsive to the CCTC treatment, while women whose youngest child is between 4-6
years old are the least responsive to the policy.
Similarly, Figure 1.10 shows the results of annual work hours according to the age groups of
the youngest child. If the women are already in the labor market, the effects are only significantly
different from zero for the women whose youngest child is under three years old.
Women whose youngest child is older are more responsive to the CCTC in terms of partic-
ipation but less responsive to CCTC in terms of work hours. The explanation is that women with
older children have less intense time constraints. At the same time, women with older children are
more likely to be in the labor market in the first place, with or without the CCTC. Once being in
the market, they are more likely to participate in the labor market intensively. Therefore, when
they are exposed to the policy, they are more likely to move from not working at all to working
full-time. As a result, if the women are already in the labor market, the effect of the CCTC on work
hours is diminished for women with older children. However, women with younger children face a
higher cost of child care services and a more restricted time constraint, and they are less likely to
be incentivized to join the labor force. If they work, they are more likely to work part-time. As a
result, they are more responsive to the policy by working different hours.
Women with different non-labor incomes also face different constraints, therefore responding
differently to the same policy. I divide the sample of married mothers with the CCTC eligible children
according to the income quantile of the husband and run the pooled OLS estimation on different
groups. Figure 1.11 shows the results of the CCTC treatment on the labor force participation rate.
The hight of the dots represent the estimation result in terms of participation rate in response to
a $1000 increase in the state-level CCTC treatment. Women whose husbands are in either the
lowest or the highest income quantiles are the most responsive to the CCTC treatment; with a more
generous state-level CCTC, these two groups are more likely to join the labor market. Even though
women from the two ends have a similar response, the mechanisms are not the same. Women with
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higher non-labor income have lower labor force participation rates because they do not face tight
budget constraints, while women with lower non-labor income have lower labor force participation
because they are more likely to be low-skill workers and may find it is not worth it to work and pay
for child care services at the same time.
Figure 1.12 shows that women whose husbands are in the lowest income quantile are more
likely to work more hours under a more generous state-level CCTC policy. The responsiveness of the
women with higher non-labor income is not very significant. This is because women whose husbands
have high incomes have higher potential earning ability themselves. When these women participate
in the labor market, they tend to do so intensively. As a result, there is not much room for them to
make adjustment on work hours. Women with a lower non-labor income however, are only loosely
attached to the labor market. There are more rooms for them to make adjustment on work hours.
1.7.2 The Earned Income Tax Credit
Some other government policies are implemented at the same time as the CCTC. These
policies include the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), universal public school, Head Start, and
others. It is possible that they might confound with the effects of the CCTC. This section deals
with these doubts, mostly concerning the EITC.
The EITC is a benefit for working people with low to moderate incomes. The EITC phases
out entirely as the family income reaches a certain level. Most importantly, the EITC does not
require a secondary earner in a family, which makes it less effective in motivating the labor force
participation for married women. As long as the family has earned income, and the earned income
is below a certain threshold, they are eligible for the EITC. The EITC, by design, is to assist low-
income families (Crandall-Hollick and Hughes, 2018). The EITC is refundable at the federal level,
and also in many states. Figure 1.13 and Figure 1.14 show the number of tax filings and the average
amount for each tax filing according to different family incomes in 2011. The graphs show that the
EITC and the CCTC have a small intersection of benefit recipients, but the majority of them are
quite different. Scholz (1996) and Hotz et al. (2003) find that the enactment of EITC increases the
labor force participation for single women by 3-6 percentage points. Eissa and Hoynes (2004) find
that the EITC has a small, adverse effect on married women. Bastian (Forthcoming) find that the
implementation of the federal EITC in 1975 has a significant effect on the labor force participation
of single women and has a minuscule effect on married women.
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The federal EITC is not a problem for my identification because controlling for individual
characteristics, the federal EITC affects all the residents in the same way. However, the state-level
EITC can potentially cause some confounding effects. Similar to the CCTC, many states provide
their state EITC with a match-up rate to the federal EITC. However, the legislative history of
the two tax credits shows that states with the CCTC are not all states that have the EITC, and
vice versa. For the states that have both the CCTC and the EITC, the timing of enactment and
amendment are not all the same. As long as the two policies do not change at the same time for
most of the variation, my identification is valid.
From Tables 1.3-1.5 and Tables 1.7, the results across different specifications show evidence
that the CCTC and the EITC work independently. The CCTC has more significant effects on
married mothers, and the EITC has more significant effects on single mothers. And the results of
the EITC are consistent with the results in the literature.
1.7.3 Other Child Care Subsidy Programs
Some research has shown the effects of public school on maternal labor supply. Gelbach
(2002) uses the children’s quarter of birth in a year and the cut-off age of school entering to estimate
the effect of free public school on female labor supply. He finds a positive effect only on single
mothers but not on married mothers. Cascio and Schanzenbach (2013) evaluate the impact of the
introduction of universal preschool for four-year-old children in Oklahoma and Georgia, and find a
moderate effect on single mothers. The results in this study show that the effects of the CCTC are
more pronounced in married mothers with the youngest child between 0-3 or 7-12 years old, while
the effect of public school is plausibly more significant on mothers whose children are 5-7 years old.
Furthermore, as long as the state legislation on schooling did not change at the same time as the
CCTC legislation, my empirical strategy can rule out the effects of public school.
Other child care subsidy programs are less likely to affect the identification of this study.
D. Blau (2003) documents the subsidy programs related to child care in the United States. Figure
1.15 is adopted from the Table 7.1 of his paper. It shows that many of these programs either focus
on low-income families, have no requirement for parents working, or only apply to the families with
children of a young age (for example the Head Start). They do not cover the same demographic
group of benefit recipients as the CCTC.
Furthermore, when adopted at the federal level, they affect all the eligible in all states in the
26
same way, then the effects of these programs can be absorbed by year fixed effects. When adopted
at the state level, they usually have different targeted population and seldom have as much variation
as the CCTC does, the effects can mostly be absorbed by the state fixed effects.
1.8 Conclusion
In this paper, I exploit the variation in the CCTC adoption and adjustment of generosity
to estimate the effects of the CCTC on maternal labor supply. I find that the CCTC considerably
increases the labor force participation rates of women with young children. Estimates derived from
using the state-level CCTC treatment variable and a differences-in-differences method indicate that:
a $1000 increase of the CCTC increases the labor force participation rate by three percentage
points for women with young children. Estimates derived from using individual CCTC treatment
variable and the IV estimation show that: a $1000 increase of the CCTC increases the labor force
participation rate by six percentage points. Conditional on being in the labor force, the CCTC also
significantly increases annual work hours for women with young children. The effects of the CCTC
are more pronounced in married mothers.
This study provides new evidence about the responsiveness of the maternal labor supply to
child care subsidy programs. Future work can be carried out to explore the effects of the CCTC on
children’s outcome, for example, cognitive ability, non-cognitive ability, employment, etc. With a
comprehensive understanding on the effects of the policy on children’s outcome, a thorough conclu-
sion for the welfare analysis of the CCTC is possible.
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Tables
Table 1.1: Current Federal CCTC: Applicable rate and the maximum credit allowable
AGI Applicable Rate 1 child 2+ children
$0-$15,000 35% $1050 $2100
$15,001-$17,000 34% $1020 $2040
$17,001-$19,000 33% $990 $1980
$19,001-$21,000 32% $960 $1920
$21,000-$23,000 31% $930 $1860
$23,001-$25,000 30% $900 $1800
$25,001-$27,000 29% $870 $1740
$27,001-$29,000 28% $840 $1680
$29,001-$31,000 27% $810 $1620
$31,001-$33,000 26% $780 $1560
$33,001-$35,000 25% $750 $1500
$35,001-$37,000 24% $720 $1440
$37,001-$39,000 23% $690 $1380
$39,001-$41,000 22% $660 $1320
$41,001-$43,000 21% $630 $1260
$43,001+ 20% $600 $1200
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics
Married Single
LFP rate(%) 65.0 78.9
(47.11) (42.94)
Work Hours 1042.0 1113.7
(902.58) (952.08)
Work Hours(1-3000) 1420.6 1528.0
(699.59) (691.27)
Age 31.8 30.6
(6.64) (6.67)
Years of Education 12.5 12.0
(3.21) (2.68)
Husband’s annual income($) 52635.5
(49835.2)
Number of Children 2.08 2.06
(0.947) (1.015)
State-year CCTC($) 1020.4 941.5
(694.84) (616.43)
Individual CCTC($) 452.2 687.5
(320.79) (512.47)
State-year EITC($) 963.2 1100.9
(759.00) (881.87)
Individual EITC($) 556.9 945.3
(584.48) (797.49)
White 64.2% 27.4%
Black 24.1% 62.8%
Latino 10.0% 8.8%
Other Races 1.7% 1.0%
Observations 64,261 22,372
Note: Samples are from PSID 1968-2015 waves, all women aged 20 to 55, either a household head or wife
of a household head. Husband’s income, number of children, the CCTC and the EITC are all conditional
on positive values. Standard deviations are in the parentheses.
29
Table 1.3: The state-level CCTC Treatment on the Labor Force Participation Rate
With Eligible Children No Eligible Children All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All All Married Single Older No Triple-
Women Women Women Women Children Children Differences
State-level CCTC ($1000) 3.28∗∗∗ 1.75∗ 1.74 1.30 0.305 0.625 1.97∗
(0.716) (0.799) (0.949) (1.56) (1.61) (0.730) (0.871)
State-level EITC ($1000) 1.86∗ 1.84∗ 0.826 4.19∗ 1.78 0.129
(0.803) (0.867) (1.01) (1.76) (1.39) (0.736)
Individual Fixed Effects no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 86,633 86,633 64,261 22,372 15,625 30,756 134,037
Adjusted R2 0.089 0.047 0.052 0.034 0.013 0.0267 0.0623
Notes: Samples are from PSID 1968-2015 waves, all women aged 20 to 55, either a household head or wife of a
household head. Column 1-2 include all mothers with one to five eligible children; column 3 and column 4 include
married and single mothers respectively; column 5 inlcudes women with children oldren than the eligible age; and
column 6 includes women with no children; column 7 pool all the sample together. The dependent variable in all
specifications is the labor force participation rate. The treatment variables are the state-level CCTC and the state-
level EITC measured at the maximum state level. Controls are years of education, age, age squared, marital status
(except columns 3 and 4), husband’s income (except columns 4), the number of children (except for column 6), age
of the youngest child (except Column 6 and 7), and state and year fixed effects. In column 7 I include a dummy
variable indicating having CCTC eligible children and interact it with all control variables. Standard errors are in
parentheses, clustered at the individual level. All money terms are inflation adjusted using 2015 price. R2 in column
2 are within R2. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table 1.4: The State-level CCTC Treatment on Maternal Annual Work Hours Conditional on
Being in the Labor Market
With Eligible Children No Eligible Children All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All All Married Single Older No Triple-
Women Women Women Women Children Children Differences
State-level CCTC ($1000) 34.0∗∗ 17.8 22.9 -16.7 4.49 15.6 12.4
(11.8) (13.2) (15.3) (29.4) (32.5) (13.4) (15.99)
State-level EITC ($1000) 9.57 6.77 -3.40 35.1 34.4 -18.2
(13.5) (15.8) (17.5) (34.8) (41.9) (15.6)
Individual Fixed Effects no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 61,063 61,063 45,591 15,472 12,053 26075 101,946
Adjusted R2 0.090 0.066 0.062 0.055 0.016 0.0351 0.0903
Notes: Samples are from PSID 1968-2015 waves, all women aged 20 to 55, either a household head or wife of a
household head. Column 1-2 include all mothers with one to five eligible children; column 3 and column 4 include
married and single mothers respectively; column 5 includes women with children older than the eligible age; and
column 6 includes women with no child. The dependent variable in all specifications is annual work hours, but
restricted to greater than zero and less than 3000. The treatment variables are the state-level CCTC and the state-
level EITC measured at the state maximum level. Controls are years of education, age, age squared, marital status
(except columns 3 and 4), husband’s income(except columns 4), the number of children (except for column 6), age
of the youngest child (except column 6 and 7), and state and year fixed effects. In column 7 I include a dummy
variable indicating having CCTC eligible children and interact it with all control variables. Standard errors are in
parentheses, clustered at the individual level. All money terms are inflation adjusted using 2015 price. R2 in column
2 are within R2. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table 1.5: The Individual CCTC Treatment on the Labor Force Participation for Low-income
Families
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All All All Married Single
OLS Panel IV IV IV
Individual CCTC ($1000) 2.79∗∗ 1.71 6.35∗∗∗ 8.41∗ 3.92∗∗
(0.985) (1.05) (1.81) (3.33) (1.63)
Individual EITC ($1000) 2.47∗ 2.22 3.07∗ 1.78 4.91∗∗
(1.06) (1.21) (1.33) (2.42) (1.50)
Individual Fixed Effects no yes yes yes yes
Observations 58,738 58,738 58,738 36,688 22,050
R2 0.0863 0.0393
F value 22.46 10.70 22.55 12.79 86.55
Notes: Samples are from PSID 1968-2015 waves, all women aged 20 to 55, either
a household head or wife of a household head, with one to five eligible children.
Columns 1-3 include all mothers; in column 4 and 5, samples are divided into mar-
ried and single mothers. The dependent variable in all specifications is labor force
participation rate. The treatment variables are the individual CCTC and the indi-
vidual EITC measured at the individual maximum level. For the IV estimation in
column 3-5, the IVs are the state-level CCTC and the state-level EITC. Controls
are years of education, age, age squared, marital status(except columns 4 and 5),
husband’s income (except columns 5), the number of children, age of the youngest
child, and state and year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered
at the individual level. All money terms are inflation adjusted using 2015 price. R2
in column 2 are within R2.∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table 1.6: First Stage Results and Diagnoses for Instrumental Variables Estimation
(1) (2)
Individual Individual
CCTC EITC
State-level CCTC 0.431∗∗∗ -0.000468
(0.00105) (0.00342)
State-level EITC -0.00491 0.653∗∗∗
(0.006122) (0.0130)
Observations 58,738 58,738
F test of excluded instruments: 937.35 1310.36
SW Weak indentification test 1711.58 2749.30
SW Under indentification test 1714.70 2754.31
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic: 879.26
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic: 852.84
Anderson-Rubin Wald test F(2,11297): 10.57
Anderson-Rubin Wald test Chi-sq(2): 21.18
Stock-Wright LM S statistic: 23.81
Hansen J statistic
(overidentification test of all instruments): 0.000
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors: 8.967
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table 1.7: Individual CCTC Treatment on Annual Work Hours Conditional on Being in the Labor
Market
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All All All Married Single
OLS Panel IV IV IV
Individual CCTC ($1000) 29.2 28.3 103.8∗∗ 178.7∗∗ 35.9
(19.11) (19.21) (33.38) (57.51) (33.37)
Individual EITC ($1000) -0.5 63.0 -0.5 43.4 -10.3
(21.26) (28.71) (25.34) (43.33) (29.79)
Individual Fixed Effects no yes yes yes yes
Observations 43,189 43,189 43,189 27,357 15,832
R2 0.0853 0.0718
F value 21.32 16.28 21.38 15.73 43.51
Notes: Samples are from PSID 1968-2015 waves, all women aged 20 to 55, either a
household head or wife of a household head, with one to five eligible children. Col-
umn 1-3 include all mothers; in column 4 and 5, samples are divided into married
and single mothers. The dependent variable in all specifications is annual work hours
conditional on already being in the labor market. The treatment variables are the in-
dividual CCTC and the individual EITC measured at the individual maximum level.
For the IV estimation in column 3-5, the IVs are the state-level CCTC and the state-
level EITC. Controls are years of education, age, age squared, marital status (except
columns 4 and 5), husband’s income (except columns 4 and 5), the number of chil-
dren, age of the youngest child, and state and year fixed effects. Standard errors are in
parentheses, clustered at the individual level. All money terms are inflation adjusted
using 2015 price. R2 in column 2 are within R2. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Figures
Figure 1.1: The Female Labor Force Participation Before and After the Birth of the First Child
by Cohort.
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Notes: Samples are from the PSID dataset, all samples are between the ages of 20 and 55 years old
at the time of survey, either a household head or a wife of a household head, with one to five CCTC
eligible children.
The labor force participation is a dummy variable that equals one if reporting positive work hours
in the survey year and equals zero otherwise. Because I restrict my sample to the household head
or the wife of a household head, I do not have a complete history of labor force participation for
every observation before and after the birth of the first child. As a result, the graph is not a perfect
representation of the life cycle participation trend.
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Figure 1.2: Major Changes of the Federal Child Care Tax Credit Legislation.
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Figure 1.3: States Had Child Care Tax Credit Policies.
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Figure 1.4: Sample Budget Lines
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Notes: In making these budget lines, I assume the following conditions: a married woman with
two children under 13 years old and a husband with a full-time job with $30,000 of annual income;
childcare costs of $3,000 day per child if wife works; tax rate and credit based on federal income tax
regulations of 2018.
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Figure 1.5: Binned Scatter Plot of the Labor Force Participation and the Age of the Youngest
Child, by States with or without the State-level CCTC.
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Notes: Samples are married women aged 20 to 55 with one to five children from PSID data. Because
the legislation lowered the eligible age of children from under 15 years old to under 13 years old, the
samples are restricted to the survey years between 1989 to 2015.
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Figure 1.6: Distribution of the State-Year CCTC Treatment Variable.
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Notes: Samples are from PSID data, all women aged 20 to 55, either a household head or wife of
a household head, with one to five eligible children. The value is inflation-adjusted using the 2015
dollar, conditional on a positive number.
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Figure 1.7: Distribution of the Individual CCTC Treatment Variable.
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Notes: Samples are from PSID data, all women aged 20 to 55, either a household head or wife of
a household head, with one to five eligible children. The value is inflation-adjusted using the 2015
dollar, conditional on a positive number.
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Figure 1.8: Correlation Between the State-year CCTC Treatment Variable and the Individual
CCTC Treatment Variable.
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Notes: Samples are from PSID data, all women aged 20 to 55, either a household head or wife of
a household head, with one to five eligible children. The value is inflation-adjusted using the 2015
dollar value, conditional on both being positive numbers.
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Figure 1.9: Regression Coefficients of the CCTC on Maternal Labor Force Participation, by the
Age of the Youngest Child, Using the State-year CCTC Treatment Variable.
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Notes: Samples are from PSID data, all women aged 20 to 55, either a household head or wife of a
household head, with one to five eligible children. The black dots represent the regression coefficients
from OLS regressions of the CCTC on the labor force participation rate, using the state-year CCTC
treatment variable. All regressions control for age, age squared, years of education, husband’s annual
income, marital status, number of children, the state-year EITC treatment variable, and the state
and year fixed effects. Confidence intervals are at the 95% level. All money terms are inflation
adjusted using 2015 dollar value.
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Figure 1.10: Regression Coefficients of the CCTC on Annual Work Hours, by the Age of the
Youngest Child, Using the State-year CCTC Treatment Variable
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Notes: Samples are from PSID dataset, all women aged 20 to 55, either a household head or wife
of a household head, with one to five eligible children. The black dots represent the regression
coefficients from OLS regressions of the CCTC on annual work hours conditional on annual work
hours being greater than zero and less than 3000, using the state-year CCTC treatment variable.
All regressions control for age, age squared, years of education, husband’s annual income, marital
status, number of children, the state-year EITC treatment variable, and the state and year fixed
effects. The confidence intervals are at 95% level. All money terms are inflation adjusted using 2015
dollar value.
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Figure 1.11: Regression Coefficients of the CCTC on Maternal Labor Force Participation, by
Husband’s Income Quantile, Using the State-year CCTC Treatment Variable.
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Notes: Samples are from PSID dataset, all married women aged 20 to 55 with one to five eligible
children. The black dots represent the regression coefficients from OLS regressions of the CCTC on
the labor force participation, using the state-year CCTC treatment variable. All regressions control
for age, age squared, years of education, number of children, age of the youngest child, the state-year
EITC treatment variable, and the state and year fixed effects. The confidence intervals are at the
95% level. All money terms are inflation adjusted using 2015 dollar value.
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Figure 1.12: Regression Coefficients of the CCTC on Maternal Labor Force Participation, by the
Age of the Youngest Child, Using the State-year CCTC Treatment Variable
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Notes: Samples are from PSID dataset, all married women aged 20 to 55 with one to five eligible
children. The black dots represent the regression coefficients from OLS regressions of the CCTC on
work hours, conditional on work hours being greater than zero and less than 3000, using the state-
year CCTC treatment variable. All regressions control for age, age squared, years of education,
number of children, age of the youngest child, the state-year EITC treatment variable, and the state
and year fixed effects. The confidence intervals are at the 95% level. All money terms are inflation
adjusted using 2015 dollar value.
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Figure 1.13: EITC and CCTC: Number of Filings, by Family Adjusted Gross Incomes in 2011.
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Figure 1.14: EITC and CCTC: Average Credit Value of Each Filing, by Family Adjusted Gross
Incomes in 2011.
0
50
0
10
00
15
00
Av
er
ag
e 
C
re
di
t E
ac
h 
Fi
lin
g(
$)
0
0-
5
5-
10
10
-1
5
15
-2
0
20
-2
5
25
-3
0
30
-4
0
40
-5
0
50
-7
0
75
-1
00
10
0-
20
0
20
0-
20
0
25
0-
50
0
50
0-
10
00
10
00
-1
00
0
15
00
-2
00
0
20
00
-5
00
0
50
00
-1
00
00
>1
00
00
Adjusted Gross Income($1000)
CCTC EITC
Notes: Source: IRS, Statistics of Income Division, July 2013.
48
Figure 1.15: Other Government Programs Aimed at Families with Children.
Notes: The information is adopted from Table 7.1 of D. Blau (2003).
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Chapter 2
The effects of the Child Care Tax
Credit on Children’s Long-term
Educational Achievement
2.1 Introduction
In the United States, the labor force participation rate for mothers with young children
reached its highest level at the beginning of the 21st century. According to the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, in 2018, the labor force participation rate of mothers with children under age six was 65.1
percent for married mothers and 76.4 percent for single mothers. For many working parents, child
care expenses can be a great burden. Parents, especially mothers, try to find a balance between
taking care of their children and continuing their careers.
The Child Care Tax Credit (CCTC) is a child care subsidy program that was first enacted
by the federal government in 1976. The CCTC allows parents to claim a tax credit for their child
care expenses if parents are employed. As of 2019, the age limit for eligible children is 12 years
old. Parents can claim 20 to 35 percent of their child care expenses up to $3,000 for one eligible
child or $6,000 for two or more eligible children according to family’s adjusted gross income. The
expenses used to calculate the credit are also limited to the income of the lowest-earning parent or
the actual child care expenses, whichever is the lower number. In addition to the federal CCTC,
50
24 states and Washington D.C. also provide their own version of CCTC, though some of them are
under different names. Most of the states link their state-level CCTC with the federal CCTC by
specifying a match-up rate. Some states provide very generous CCTC benefits in certain years,
other states only provide a moderate subsidy.
The uniqueness of the CCTC is that it is not a pure income subsidy program for the
marginal population. To be eligible for the credit, both parents have to be employed if they are
married. Likewise, single parents need to be employed to be eligible for the tax credit as well, and
for divorced couples, the main provider of the children must be employed. In addition, working
parents have to pay for their child care expenses in the market. Typical eligible expenses are those
for day care, after-school care, summer camp, etc. The objective of the CCTC is to encourage the
parents, especially the mothers, to join or stay in the labor force.
There is evidence that the CCTC has a significant effect on the labor force participation
of mothers. Michalopoulos et al. (1992), Leibowitz et al. (1992), and S. L. Averett et al. (1997)
find that the CCTC has a positive effect on mothers’ employment. In Chapter One, I find that the
CCTC significantly increases the labor force participation rate of mothers. A $1,000 increase in the
CCTC increases the labor force participation rate by six percentage points.
If the CCTC successfully pulls mothers in the labor market, there must be a substitution of
child care provided at home with market-provided child care services. If it is the case, the natural
question that follows is: What are the effects of the CCTC on children’s well-being?
Potentially, the CCTC has two channels through which it impacts the well-being of children.
First, with the subsidy and the additional income of the working mother, there could be an income
effect.1 Higher family income provides more resources for the development of children. Second,
because the subsidy policy substitutes maternal child care with purchased child care services, there
could be a time-reallocation effect. With this substitution of child care, children can receive child
care with different quality or are exposed to different amounts of attention, which can affect the
development of children.
There could also be other channels in which the CCTC can have some impact on children’s
well-beings. Furthermore, there are many aspects of the children’s well-being that are worth explor-
1 This is based on the assumption that the net family income after the mother joins the labor market nets of the
subsidized child care service is greater than the income of mother providing child care by herself, which is plausible
for many married couples because they are less likely to be eligible for the Earned Income Tax Credit or other welfare
programs.
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ing. This paper focuses on the effects of the CCTC policy exposure from early ages on the long-term
educational achievement of children. The educational achievement is an important indicator for the
cognitive development and an effective predictor for future employment and life-time earnings.
There is a rich pool of literature on the income effect of welfare and child care subsidy
programs on children’s well-being. For example, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is a subsidy
program mainly assisting low-income families. It does not require a secondary earner in families with
married couples. As a result, the effects of the EITC can be interpreted as an income effect. Dahl and
Lochner (2012) use the exogenous policy shocks of the EITC as an instrumental variable and find a
positive effect of the family income on math and reading test scores. The effects are more pronounced
in children from disadvantaged families. Maxfield (2014) and Manoli and Turner (2018) find that the
EITC increases the probability of children going to college. Bastian and Michelmore (2018) find that
exposure to more financial benefits from the EITC during teenage years increases the probability
of children graduating from high school and college. This exposure also has a positive impact on
the employment and earning ability of these children in adulthood. Using Norwegian data and
exogenous policy shocks of child care subsidy program, Black et al. (2014) find that: being exposed
to child care subsidy at the age of five positively impacts the high school academic performances.
The institutional setting of the Norwegian child care subsidy program allows researchers to isolate
the mechanism as an income effect. Clark-Kauffman et al. (2003) also find that welfare policies that
work as an earning supplement have positive effects on academic achievement.
Relatively little literature focuses on subsidy programs with employment requirements. In
terms of the short-term effect of the child care subsidy on children’s well-being, Baker et al. (2008)
find that the universally accessible child care program in Quebec, Canada led to higher rates of
anxiety and behavioral problems. It also leads to worse academic performance and health condition.
Herbst (2017) examine the long-term effects of the universal child care program introduced by U.S.
Lanham Act during World War II. He finds that kindergarten-aged children affected by the Lanham
Act are more likely to go to college and be employed in adulthood. However, it is difficult to compare
the results of a war-time policy to the many policies implemented during peace periods. Fort et al.
(2020) find one additional day care month at age 0–2 reduces intelligence quotient by 0.5% (4.7% of
a standard deviation) at ages 8–14 in a relatively affluent population.
This paper contributes to the literature in that it is the first paper to examine the long-term
effects of the CCTC on children’s educational achievement. I document the CCTC legislative history
52
and construct a comprehensive data set for the CCTC policy variation (see Chapter One for details).
Using the legislative history, I assign a number for each child with the CCTC policy exposure in
their childhood according to the birth year and state of residency. Focusing on samples from the
Penal Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), I estimate the effects of CCTC exposure in childhood on
educational achievement in adulthood. I construct the policy exposure at three CCTC age groups:
ages 1-4, 5-8, and 9-12. By dividing the CCTC exposure into different age goups, I can test the
effects of CCTC policy exposure from different ages. The policy exposure is measured at the state
level, it is derived from the maximum CCTC benefits allowed in a certain state and in a certain year.
I take the sum of the CCTC benefits through the age groups to get the treatment variables. I find
that CCTC exposure at early ages is negatively associated with the educational achievement of the
children at their adulthood. In terms of the magnitude, a $1,000 increase of CCTC exposure at ages
1-4, decreases the years of education by 0.06 year. Except for explaining how the CCTC affects the
educational achievement of children, this paper also contributes to the literature by providing new
evidence for the relationship between maternal employment and children’s long-term educational
achievement.
2.2 Data
The samples used in this analysis are from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
The PSID consists of 4,802 households and 18,233 individuals in the first wave of the survey in 1968.
The sample households and the extended households were followed up annually from 1968 to 1997,
and biennially from 1997 to the present.2
The PSID data set provides information about the educational achievement of sample in-
dividuals in terms of years of education attained over time. I use the highest value of the years of
education after they turned 24 years old to represent the final educational achievement. The years of
education is a good indicator for educational achievement, however, one additional year of education
in high school is quite different from an additional year of education in postgraduate level. In order
to capture the effect on the level of educational achievement, I code a dummy variable indicating
college completion using years of education. If someone has less than 16 years of education, I assign
2 Among the 4,802 original households, 2,930 households are from a nationally representative sample (Survey
Research Center at University of Michigan or SRC sample), and the other 1,872 are from a low-income household
sample (Survey of Economic Opportunity or SEO sample).
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zero to the variable; if someone has 16 years of education or above, I assign one to the variable. I
code a dummy variable for high school completion using 12 years of education as the threshold in
the same way.
I collect the CCTC policy variation by reading the federal income tax code and state statutes.
I describe the details of these information in Chapter One. The PSID provides linkage information
between parents and children. Using this linkage information, I can match individual information
to parents information during the children’s childhood. The information about the CCTC policy
exposure is the main information of interest, other useful information related to the child’s educa-
tional achievement include the state and year children were born, number of older siblings at birth,
mother’s marital status at birth, mother’s educational achievement, and mother’s employment status
at birth. Some information about the husbands are also available. I include children born between
1967-1990 from all 50 U.S. states and Washington D.C., as they are exposed to the CCTC at least
for some years in their childhood.
Through the PSID children-mother linkage, I can link 8,507 children with their mothers.
Among these children observations, 3,321 have all the information used as control variables. The
3,321 observations are the full sample used in the analysis. Table 2.1 summarizes the variables.
The average years of education of the children is 14.19 with a standard deviation of 2.05. Among
the sample, 94.97% of the children have completed high school, and 36.31% have completed college
education.3 Females make up 53.21% of the sample. The racial composition is 57.96% white, 36.77%
African American, 4.25% Hispanic, and 1% other races. The average years of education received
by mothers is 10.36. Three quarters of the children were born into families with two parents; the
other one quarter were born into single-mother families. Sums of the incomes of the spouse of the
mothers in each corresponding age groups are also reported. The sum of the spouse income in the
three age groups ranges between $192,000 and $237,000, which means an annual income of around
$50,000 (these values are inflation-adjusted using 2015 dollar value).
The CCTC policy exposure is organized in three age groups. Each CCTC treatment variable
represents the sum of the policy benefits exposed to the individuals during certain age range. The
statistics in Table 2.1 are conditional on positive values. The mean value of the sum of the CCTC
3 As describe above, the years of education used to code the dummy variables of high school completion and college
completion are the highest years of education at age 25 or older. As a result, the high school completion rate is not
comparable to the completion rate within a birth cohort, because some people might obtain their certificates years
after the regular completion ages and report the corresponding years of education.
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exposure at ages 1-4, 5-8, and 9-12 are $2,424, $2,803, and $3,072, respectively. The sum of the
CCTC policy exposure from ages 1-12 is $6,082. These values can be translated to an average
benefits exposure of around $600 to $750 every year (these values are inflation-adjusted using 2015
dollar value). The CCTC treatment variables are measured at the state maximum level. I do not
include the federal CCTC because the federal CCTC has fewer variation and it affects all children
in the sample in the same way as long as they are in the same birth cohorts. As I describe in the
next section, the federal CCTC variation can be easily controlled by including the birth cohort fixed
effects.
2.3 Empirical Strategy
There is a rich literature on how parental interaction and family environment at early ages
play a critical role in human capital formation of children (J. J. Heckman, 2000; J. J. Heckman,
2006). Cunha and J. Heckman (2007) develop a theoretical model showing that the human capital
formation is an accumulative process, therefore, the human capital investment at different ages
are complementary rather than substitutes. They also show that human capital investment and
parental interaction received at early ages yields much higher returns than those receive at older
ages. The formation of certain ability is very sensitive to ages, once it passes certain age window,
it is hard to catch up in later ages. Based on these profound insight, it is reasonable to assume
that the effect of exposure to the CCTC policy and the induced maternal employment on children’s
educational achievement can differ at different ages. Plausibly, the substitution from maternal care
to market-provided care might impact younger children more than older children.
Considering the human capital formation process described above, I propose dividing the
policy exposure into three age groups: CCTC exposure at ages 1-4, 5-8, and 9-12. During the first
age span of 1-4 years old, children needs more intense child care, market-provided child care services
are more expensive and they are not a good substitute for maternal child care. Chapter one shows
that mothers with younger children have relatively elastic labor supply. During ages 5-8, alternative
child care services are more available and cheaper. Most states provide free formal schooling. These
ages are also the time that mothers are more likely to go back to the labor market. During ages 9-12,
school takes a longer share of children’s time, children need less intensive child care from parents,
and the human capital formation tends to be stable. Although it might be attempting to use more
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narrowly-defined age groups, I still propose to use three age groups given the limitation of the sample
size.
In order to estimate the effects of the exposure to the CCTC in childhood at different ages
on the educational achievement in adulthood, I propose the empirical strategy denoted by
Edui = β0 + β1CCTCi + β2Xi + β3BirthStatei + β4BirthY eari + µi. (2.1)
The dependent variable Edui represents educational attainment in adulthood for a child i born in
state s and year t. In some specifications it is a dummy variable indicating whether the child grad-
uated from college. In some specification the dependent variable is a continuous variable indicating
years of education attained. The treatment variable CCTCi indicates the sum of the state CCTC
exposure when the child was between ages 1-4, 5-8, or 9-12, or the combination of all the three
groups. They are the sum of the policy exposure during these age groups. I match the CCTC
legislative information to a child according to the age and birth year of the child and take the sum
of the four years. I also use the total state CCTC policy exposure from ages 1-12 as the treatment
variable in some specifications. The notation, Xi, represents control variables including children’s
gender, race, mother’s marital status and education at birth, sum of the income of the spouse of the
mother over the four-year groups if the mother was married. BirthStatei and BirthY eari are birth
state and birth year fixed effects. The disturbance term is µi.
The coefficients of interest are β1. The CCTC treatment variables are measured at the state
maximum level, they represent the policy treatment intensity received by individuals living in certain
states and years when they are in the three age groups. Since the CCTC treatment intensities are
measured at state-level, they provide exogenous shocks to the educational achievement of individual
children. Conditional on the year of birth and state of birth, the coefficients can be interpreted
as the CCTC treatment effects at different age groups on educational achievement in adulthood.
Using ordinary least square estimation, I compare children exposed to the CCTC with children not
exposed to the policy at certain ages, or I can compare children exposed to more CCTC benefits
with children exposed to less CCTC benefits at certain age group.
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2.4 Results
Table 2.2 reports the estimation results for the effects of the CCTC on years of education
in adulthood. The dependent variable is years of education completed when they reached at least
25 years old. The treatment variables are the sum of CCTC policy exposure at ages 1-4, 5-8, and
9-12 measured at the state level. All specifications control for gender, race, mother’s marital status
at birth of the child, mother’s education, sum of the income of the spouse of the mother in the
according age groups, and birth year and birth state fixed effects. Column 1 shows results using
the sum of CCTC policy exposure measured at ages 1-4. Column 2 shows results using the sum of
CCTC policy exposure measured at ages 5-8. Column 3 shows results using the sum of CCTC policy
exposure measured at ages 9-12. Column 4 shows results using all the three treatment variables.
Finally, Column 5 shows results using the total state CCTC policy exposure from ages 1-12.
The coefficient in column 1 of Table 2.2 means: a $1,000 increase in the CCTC exposure
during ages 1-4 decreases the years of education in adulthood by 0.06 years. Taking the mean value
of the sum of the policy exposure at ages 1-4, which is around $2,400, the result can be interpreted
as: exposed to the average value of CCTC at ages 1-4 reduces the years of education by 0.144 years.
The coefficient in column 2 of Table 2.2 also shows negative value, but the result is smaller and
not statistically significant. The coefficient in column 3 of Table 2.2 is also negative, but the effect
is even smaller. In column 4, after putting all the treatment variables in the same regression, the
magnitude of the coefficients are smaller for CCTC exposure at ages 1-4 and 5-8, and the standard
errors are much bigger. As a result, none of the coefficients in column 4 are significantly different
from zero, though the negative association seems to hold. Column 5 also shows the total exposure
of state CCTC does not significantly affect the years of education in adulthood.
In Table 2.3, I divide my sample according to the marital status of the mother when the
children were born. I run the same analysis with the same control variables. The columns with
odd numbers include sample children whose mothers were married when the children were born.
The columns with even numbers include samples whose mothers were single when the children were
born. I use the CCTC treatment variable measured at different age groups in the first three pairs of
the analysis, and I add all three treatment variables in column 7 and 8. In the last pair of analysis
as in column 9 and 10, I use the total state CCTC policy exposure from ages 1-12 as the treatment
variable.
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Column 1 of Table 2.3 shows that: exposure to more CCTC benefits at ages 1-4 decreases
the years of education in adulthood for children born into two-parent families. Column 2 of Table 2.3
shows that: exposed to more CCTC policy at ages 1-4 increases the years of education in adulthood
for children born into single-mother families. Column 3 and column 4 shows a similar pattern, but
the effect is smaller and not as significant as using policy exposure measured at ages 1-4. Results in
column 5 and column 6 are even more noisy, it is hard to see any pattern. In column 7 and column 8,
when adding all the three treatment variables in one regression, only the CCTC policy exposure at
ages 1-4 is significantly smaller than zero at the 5% level for children born into two-parent families.
None of the coefficients are significant for children of single mothers. Finally, the sum of the state
CCTC from ages 1-12 has a significant negative effect on years of education for children of married
mothers. In terms of the magnitude, a $1,000 increase in the total CCTC exposure from ages 1-12
reduces the years of education by 0.03 years.
Table 2.4 reports the estimation results using college completion as the dependent variable.
All the treatment variables and control variables are the same as in Table 2.2 and Table 2.3. Results
reported in Table 2.4 are similar to those in Table 2.2. For example, column 1 shows that exposure
to the CCTC at ages 1-4 reduces the chance of completing four-year college. The effect is significant
at the 10% level. The negative effect using CCTC policy exposure at ages 5-8 on college completion
is smaller but still significantly different from zero at the 10% level. The effect of CCTC exposure at
ages 9-12 is not significant, and when putting all three treatment variables in one regression, none of
the three coefficients is significant any more. In column 5, I use the total CCTC exposure from ages
1-12 as the treatment variable. The coefficient shows some plausible negative effects of the CCTC
exposure on college completion, but the effect is not statistically significant.
In Table 2.5, I divide my sample according to mother’s marital status and run the same
regression using college completion as the dependent variable. Similarly, the negative effect of early
age exposure to the CCTC is driven by children born into two-parent families. The effects on children
from single mother families are not significant. The effects are more muddled when adding all the
three treatment variables in one regression. But if I use the total CCTC exposure from ages 1-12 as
the treatment variable, the negative effect is significant for children born into two-parent families,
as shown in column 9.
It seems the early age exposure to CCTC is negatively associated with educational achieve-
ment in adulthood, especially for children born into two-parent families. The high school completion
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rate is about 95% in the sample. As a result, there is not much variation in the high school com-
pletion rate. Therefore, there seems to be no space for the CCTC to influence the high school
completion rate. For this reason, I do not include the results using high school completion as the
dependent variable.
The mother’s parenting skill is an important factor in children’s educational achievement.
To explore how mother’s skill interacting with the CCTC policy exposure of the child, I divide my
sample according to mother’s educational attainment, using 12 years of education as the threshold.
If a mother has less than 12 years of education, I treat her as not finishing high school. If a mother
has 12 or more years of education, I treat her as high school graduate. Table 2.6 shows the results
for the effects of the CCTC on children’s years of education, by mother’s high school completion.
Column 1 of Table 2.6 shows results using the CCTC exposure measured at ages 1-4. The results in
column 1 mean that: the CCTC only negatively affects the educational achievement of the children
whose mothers are high school graduates. Through columns 3-6, when using CCTC policy exposure
measured at older ages, the effects are not significant. Finally, when using all three treatment
variables, only the coefficient for policy exposure at ages 1-4 is marginally significant and less than
zero.
2.5 Discussion
The objective of the CCTC is to provide an incentive for mothers to join the labor market
by reducing the burden of child care expenses. There are many random factors that can affect the
legislative process, therefore, the state-level CCTC policy variation provides exogenous shocks to
the human capital formation of the children. The results summarized in the previous section suggest
CCTC policy exposure at early ages affects the human capital formation of children. This section
discusses the potential channels.
First, married mothers are less likely to be in the labor market than single mothers in
general. Therefore, married mothers have more elastic labor supply compared with single mothers.
Chapter One shows that the labor force participation of married mothers are more responsive to
the CCTC compared with that of single mothers. Based on the results, when exposed to CCTC
policy at the early ages, children whose mothers are married are more likely to be moved from more
intensive maternal care to less intensive purchased child care. Compared with children not exposed
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to the policy at the same ages, the change in the intensity of child care can make a difference in their
human capital formation. Though mothers are able to bring in more income for the family, it is likely
that the time allocation effect dominates the income effect. Therefore, children whose mothers were
married when they were born are more likely to be affected by the CCTC exposure at early ages
than children with single mother. In Table 2.3 and Table 2.5, the estimation for CCTC exposure
from age groups of 1-4 and 5-8 for children of married mothers are negative and significantly different
from zero. These results confirm the hypothesis.
Although single mothers are less responsive to the CCTC, they can also potentially be
affected by the policy, given they have some income tax liabilities. In this case, the CCTC has
some effect on the human capital formation of the children of the single mothers. But in reality
most single mothers have lower income and lower income tax liability. As a result, they are not all
eligible for the CCTC. In Table 2.3 and Table 2.5, the coefficients of the early age CCTC exposure
for children of single mothers are not statistically significant; and the standard errors are bigger
because the sample size is small. It is hard to conclude if the policy has any effect on educational
achievement for children of single mothers.
Second, although the time input is an important factor for human capital formation, espe-
cially in the early ages, the quality of the child care can also make a significant impact on children.
Mothers with a higher skill or a better education have a higher earning ability, and they can provide
child care of higher quality as well. If more educated mothers are attracted to the labor market, it
is plausible that their children receive a bigger reduction in the child care quality compared with
children whose mother are less educated. To the contrary, when less educated mothers join the labor
market after giving birth, the quality downgrade of the child care received by their children may
not be as significant. This could explain the disparity of the effects of CCTC policy exposure across
mothers’ educational achievement. As shown in Table 2.6, For children whose mothers did not finish
high school, early age CCTC exposure has no significant effects on their educational achievement.
On the contrary, for children whose mother finished at least high school, early age CCTC exposure
does have a significant negative effect on their educational achievements.
Additionally, for the CCTC treatment at age group of 8-12, though the effects are not
significant for most specifications, there seems to be a trend that the coefficient turns to positive
sign. It is possible that at older ages, the maternal care is not as significant as that in early ages.
As a result, the time reallocation effect does not dominates the income effect.
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2.6 Conclusion
In Chaper One, I find the CCTC has a significant impact on the labor force participation
rate of mothers. A $1,000 increase in the CCTC measured at the individual eligible level increases
the labor force participation rate by six percentage points. When the CCTC pulls mothers back to
the labor market, it is natural to ask: what is the impact on the well-being of the children of these
mothers? This chapter attempts to answer this question by focusing on the long-term educational
achievement of children. I use the information about the CCTC legislative history and divide the
CCTC policy exposure in the childhood into different age groups. Using data from the PSID, I find
that CCTC policy exposure at early ages is negatively associated with the educational achievement
in adulthood.
The purpose of the CCTC is to promote the labor force participation of mothers especially.
The negative consequence of the CCTC on children’s well-being is definitely not the intended purpose
of the policy. There seems to be some trend that the negative effect of CCTC exposure is offset by
the positive effect at older ages. When the child care needs of the children are not as intense as in
the early ages and when children are less sensitive to the maternal care, the income effect of the
CCTC is likely to offset the time allocation effect of the mothers. Nevertheless, policy makers need
to be fully informed about the impact of the policy on the targeted population and take all the side
effects into account.
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Tables
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
N Mean Std Dev Min Max
Dependent variables:
Years of schooling 3,321 14.19 (2.05) 0 17
College Graduate 3,321 36.31%
High School Graduate 3,321 94.97%
Controll variables:
Female 3,321 53.21%
White 3,321 57.96%
Black 3,321 36.77%
Hispanic 3,321 4.25%
Other Race 3,321 1.02%
Birth Year 3,321 1967 1990
Mother’s married at birth 3,321 74.62%
Mother’s years of education 3,321 10.36 (5.03) 0 20
Sum Mother’s spouse’s income ages 1-4 ($ > 0) 2,464 192,327.30 (135,137.70) 78.38 2,242,593.00
Sum Mother’s spouse’s income ages 5-8 ($ > 0) 2,243 219,141.00 (187,500.50) 521.50 2,976,719.00
Sum Mother’s spouse’s income ages 9-12 ($ > 0) 2,080 236,423.80 (224,652.50) 191.89 4,029,732.00
Treatment variables:
Sum State CCTC ages 1-4 ($ > 0) 647 2,423.91 (1,985.57) 115.05 13,422.13
Sum State CCTC ages 5-8 ($ > 0) 814 2,802.95 (2,337.71) 115.05 12,999.18
Sum State CCTC ages 9-12 ($ > 0) 921 3,071.62 (2,514.60) 156.43 12,999.18
Sum State CCTC ages 1-12 ($ > 0) 1,098 6,082.73 5730.52 156.43 33858.35
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Table 2.2: The Effects of the CCTC on Years of Education in Adulthood
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sum State CCTC 1-4 ($1000) -0.0597∗ -0.0448
(0.0272) (0.0398)
Sum State CCTC 5-8 ($1000) -0.0329 -0.0278
(0.0258) (0.0411)
Sum State CCTC 9-12 ($1000) -0.000104 0.0189
(0.0297) (0.0364)
Sum State CCTC 1-12 ($1000) -0.0126
(0.0115)
Sum Husband Income 1-4 ($1000) 0.00189∗∗ 0.00188∗∗ 0.00190∗∗ 0.00189∗∗ 0.00188∗∗
(0.000640) (0.000640) (0.000641) (0.000639) (0.000639)
Sum Husband Income 5-8 ($1000) 0.000583 0.000587 0.000573 0.000591 0.000581
(0.000589) (0.000586) (0.000589) (0.000588) (0.000586)
Sum Husband income 9-12 ($1000) 0.00108∗∗ 0.00109∗∗ 0.00110∗∗ 0.00107∗∗ 0.00110∗∗
(0.000370) (0.000369) (0.000372) (0.000372) (0.000370)
Female 0.542∗∗∗ 0.541∗∗∗ 0.541∗∗∗ 0.542∗∗∗ 0.541∗∗∗
(0.0592) (0.0586) (0.0590) (0.0595) (0.0587)
Black -0.0885 -0.0876 -0.0821 -0.0893 -0.0870
(0.0926) (0.0933) (0.0931) (0.0930) (0.0935)
Hispanic -0.0381 -0.0442 -0.0438 -0.0390 -0.0433
(0.149) (0.148) (0.147) (0.149) (0.147)
Other Races -0.102 -0.109 -0.106 -0.103 -0.108
(0.364) (0.364) (0.365) (0.366) (0.364)
Mother Married at Birth 0.480∗∗ 0.481∗∗ 0.479∗∗ 0.480∗∗ 0.481∗∗
(0.140) (0.140) (0.140) (0.140) (0.140)
Birth State Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,321 3,321 3,321 3,321 3,321
R2 0.189 0.188 0.188 0.189 0.188
Notes: Clustered Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the birth state level.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2.3: The Effects of the CCTC on Years of Education by Mother’s Marital Status at Birth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Married Single Married Single Married Single Married Single Married Single
Sum State CCTC 1-4 ($1000) -0.119∗∗ 0.118∗ -0.0955∗ 0.0810
(0.0368) (0.0565) (0.0471) (0.0742)
Sum State CCTC 5-8 ($1000) -0.0692∗ 0.0501 -0.0380 0.0604
(0.0259) (0.0797) (0.0514) (0.0832)
Sum State CCTC 9-12 ($1000) -0.0191 -0.0536 0.0130 -0.0725
(0.0295) (0.0716) (0.0441) (0.0689)
Sum State CCTC 1-12 ($1000) -0.0295∗∗ 0.0152
(0.0105) (0.0390)
Sum Husband Income 1-4 ($1000) 0.00228∗∗∗ -0.00595∗∗ 0.00227∗∗∗ -0.00585∗∗ 0.00230∗∗∗ -0.00614∗∗ 0.00227∗∗∗ -0.00610∗∗ 0.00227∗∗∗ -0.00586∗∗
(0.000648) (0.00201) (0.000650) (0.00200) (0.000654) (0.00191) (0.000647) (0.00189) (0.000650) (0.00197)
Sum Husband Income 5-8 ($1000) 0.000101 0.00579∗∗∗ 0.000102 0.00578∗∗∗ 0.0000780 0.00597∗∗∗ 0.000110 0.00589∗∗∗ 0.0000894 0.00579∗∗∗
(0.000551) (0.00141) (0.000546) (0.00140) (0.000554) (0.00136) (0.000549) (0.00135) (0.000547) (0.00139)
Sum Husband income 9-12 ($1000) 0.00103∗∗ 0.00148 0.00106∗∗ 0.00143 0.00107∗∗ 0.00141 0.00103∗∗ 0.00152 0.00107∗∗ 0.00141
(0.000369) (0.00113) (0.000369) (0.00111) (0.000371) (0.00113) (0.0000370) (0.00112) (0.0000369) (0.00112)
Female 0.572∗∗∗ 0.478∗∗∗ 0.570∗∗∗ 0.483∗∗∗ 0.568∗∗∗ 0.476∗∗∗ 0.572∗∗∗ 0.484∗∗∗ 0.571∗∗∗ 0.479∗∗∗
(0.0774) (0.123) (0.0772) (0.127) (0.0785) (0.124) (0.0774) (0.126) (0.0775) (0.125)
Black -0.146 0.307 -0.148 0.295 -0.134 0.312 -0.150 0.311 -0.147 0.297
(0.0952) (0.199) (0.0962) (0.199) (0.0971) (0.196) (0.0958) (0.200) (0.0967) (0.198)
Hispanic -0.0994 0.516 -0.111 0.532 -0.110 0.559 -0.101 0.554 -0.111 0.524
(0.157) (0.532) (0.158) (0.526) (0.158) (0.529) (0.160) (0.518) (0.157) (0.540)
Other Races -0.0519 -0.111 -0.0724 -0.130 -0.0622 -0.0966 -0.0585 -0.121 -0.0680 -0.118
(0.493) (0.825) (0.491) (0.842) (0.491) (0.825) (0.493) (0.831) (0.490) (0.837)
Birth State Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2478 843 2478 843 2478 843 2478 843 2478 843
2478 843
R2 0.178 0.216 0.177 0.215 0.175 0.215 0.178 0.217 0.177 0.215
Notes: Clustered Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the birth state level.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2.4: The Effects of the CCTC on College Completion in Adulthood
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
college college college college college
Sum State CCTC 1-4 ($1000) -0.0164 -0.0105
(0.00930) (0.0114)
Sum State CCTC 5-8 ($1000) -0.0116 -0.00985
(0.00616) (0.0100)
Sum State CCTC 9-12 ($1000) -0.00250 0.00369
(0.00861) (0.0112)
Sum State CCTC 1-12 ($1000) -0.00454
(0.00299)
Sum Husband Income 1-4 ($1000) 0.000462∗∗ 0.000459∗∗ 0.000463∗∗ 0.000460∗∗ 0.000459∗∗
(0.000155) (0.000155) (0.000155) (0.000155) (0.000155)
Sum Husband Income 5-8 ($1000) 0.0000962 0.0000981 0.0000934 0.0000990 0.0000962
(0.000150) (0.000149) (0.000150) (0.000149) (0.000149)
Sum Husband income 9-12 ($1000) 0.000259∗∗ 0.000262∗∗ 0.000265∗∗ 0.000258∗∗ 0.000264∗∗
(0.0000901) (0.0000901) (0.0000909) (0.0000905) (0.0000901)
Female 0.102∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗
(0.0151) (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0151) (0.0150)
Black -0.0605∗ -0.0607∗ -0.0590∗ -0.0610∗ -0.0605∗
(0.0241) (0.0241) (0.0242) (0.0241) (0.0242)
Hispanic 0.000987 -0.000747 -0.000708 0.000455 -0.000427
(0.0377) (0.0376) (0.0373) (0.0378) (0.0375)
Other Races -0.0246 -0.0266 -0.0260 -0.0253 -0.0263
(0.0899) (0.0897) (0.0901) (0.0900) (0.0897)
Mother Married at Birth 0.0656∗ 0.0661∗ 0.0655∗ 0.0659∗ 0.0661∗
(0.0323) (0.0322) (0.0322) (0.0323) (0.0322)
Birth State Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,321 3,321 3,321 3,321 3,321
R2 0.165 0.165 0.164 0.166 0.165
Notes: Clustered Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the birth state level.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2.5: The Effects of the CCTC on College Completion in Adulthood by Mother’s Marital Status at Birth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Married Single Married Single Married Single Married Single Married Single
Sum State CCTC 1-4 ($1000) -0.0285∗ 0.0149 -0.0202 0.00696
(0.0119) (0.0197) (0.0135) (0.0233)
Sum State CCTC 5-8 ($1000) -0.0182∗∗ -0.00530 -0.0135 0.00875
(0.00629) (0.0157) (0.0116) (0.0160)
Sum State CCTC 9-12 ($1000) -0.00435 -0.0000284 0.00536 -0.0315
(0.00916) (0.0157) (0.0132) (0.0171)
Sum State CCTC 9-12 -0.00730∗ -0.00669
(0.00285) (0.00927)
Sum Husband Income 1-4 ($1000) 0.000524∗∗ -0.00137∗∗ 0.000521∗∗ -0.00138∗∗ 0.000529∗∗ -0.00147∗∗ 0.000521∗∗ -0.00147∗∗ 0.000522∗∗ -0.00140∗∗
(0.000155) (0.000499) (0.000155) (0.000493) (0.000157) (0.000464) (0.000155) (0.000461) (0.000155) (0.000486)
Sum Husband Income 5-8 ($1000) 0.0000168 0.00103∗∗ 0000176 0.00104∗∗ 0.0000114 0.00110∗∗∗ 0.0000205 0.00109∗∗ 0.0000142 0.00106∗∗
(0.000151) (0.000324) (0.000150) (0.000320) (0.000152) (0.000309) (0.000151) (0.000307) (0.000150) (0.000314)
Sum Husband income 9-12 ($1000) 0.000261∗ -0.0000338 0.000267∗∗ -0.0000492 0.000270∗∗ -0.0000383 0.000260∗ -0.0000261 0.000269∗∗ -0.0000537
(0.0000990) (0.000226) (0.0000991) (0.000227) (0.0000999) (0.000232) (0.0000996) (0.000227) (0.0000990) (0.000227)
Female 0.107∗∗∗ 0.0912∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.0904∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.0906∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.0917∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.0901∗∗
(0.0179) (0.0256) (0.0179) (0.0264) (0.0181) (0.0257) (0.0179) (0.0266) (0.0179) (0.0259)
Black -0.0559∗ -0.0544 -0.0568∗ -0.0543 -0.0531 -0.0496 -0.0572∗ -0.0498 -0.0563∗ -0.0531
(0.0276) (0.0426) (0.0277) (0.0423) (0.0284) (0.0422) (0.0276) (0.0427) (0.0280) (0.0419)
Hispanic -0.00126 0.0153 -0.00405 0.0178 -0.00382 0.0310 -0.00166 0.0311 -0.00412 0.0220
(0.0298) (0.131) (0.0299) (0.131) (0.0300) (0.130) (0.0300) (0.128) (0.0298) (0.131)
Other Races -0.0114 -0.0915 -0.0166 -0.0888 -0.0139 -0.0851 -0.0136 -0.0885 -0.0154 -0.0866
(0.115) (0.112) (0.115) (0.114) (0.115) (0.111) (0.115) (0.112) (0.115) (0.113)
Birth State Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2478 843 2478 843 2478 843 2478 843 2478 843
R2 0.162 0.161 0.162 0.160 0.160 0.164 0.163 0.165 0.161 0.161
Notes: Clustered Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the birth state level.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2.6: The Effects of the CCTC on Years of Education by Mother’s Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Below HS Above HS Below HS Above HS Below HS Above HS Below HS Above HS Below HS Above HS
Sum State CCTC 1-4 ($1000) 0.117 -0.0920∗∗ 0.114 -0.0845
(0.0815) (0.0312) (0.0928) (0.0469)
Sum State CCTC 5-8 ($1000) -0.0177 -0.0331 0.00138 -0.0247
(0.0657) (0.0318) (0.0657) (0.0566)
Sum State CCTC 9-12 ($1000) -0.0676 0.00789 -0.0669 0.0345
(0.0394) (0.0389) (0.0409) (0.0549)
Sum State CCTC 1-12 ($1000) -0.0177 -0.0138
(0.0273) (0.0147)
Sum Husband Income 1-4 ($1000) 0.00171 0.00140∗ 0.00163 0.00139∗ 0.00152 0.00140∗ 0.00158 0.00140∗ 0.00159 0.00139∗
(0.00120) (0.000680) (0.00119) (0.000681) (0.00117) (0.000682) (0.00116) (0.000678) (0.00118) (0.000681)
Sum Husband Income 5-8 ($1000) 0.00244∗ 0.000230 0.00254∗ 0.000230 0.00261∗ 0.000226 0.00253∗ 0.000243 0.00258∗ 0.000224
(0.00101) (0.000633) (0.00100) (0.000630) (0.00101) (0.000637) (0.00100) (0.000640) (0.00100) (0.000631)
Sum Husband income 9-12 ($1000) 0.00109 0.00110∗∗ 0.00103 0.00112∗∗ 0.00106 0.00112∗∗ 0.00111 0.00108∗ 0.00103 0.00112∗∗
(0.00118) (0.000404) (0.00116) (0.000404) (0.00117) (0.000406) (0.00117) (0.000405) (0.00116) (0.000404)
Female 0.441∗∗∗ 0.654∗∗∗ 0.444∗∗∗ 0.653∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗ 0.652∗∗∗ 0.443∗∗∗ 0.654∗∗∗ 0.445∗∗∗ 0.653∗∗∗
(0.116) (0.0801) (0.116) (0.0804) (0.116) (0.0800) (0.114) (0.0805) (0.117) (0.0801)
Black -0.0779 -0.0182 -0.0925 -0.0141 -0.0901 -0.00390 -0.0769 -0.0163 -0.0941 -0.0138
(0.170) (0.131) (0.169) (0.132) (0.168) (0.131) (0.168) (0.132) (0.169) (0.132)
Hispanic 0.119 0.0451 0.141 0.0365 0.134 0.0397 0.113 0.0452 0.143 0.0378
(0.241) (0.204) (0.238) (0.201) (0.234) (0.200) (0.238) (0.203) (0.237) (0.202)
Other Races -0.452 0.353 -0.452 0.338 -0.462 0.350 -0.459 0.348 -0.452 0.343
(0.303) (0.500) (0.308) (0.497) (0.304) (0.497) (0.306) (0.504) (0.305) (0.496)
Mother Married at Birth -0.236 0.632∗∗∗ -0.236 0.631∗∗∗ -0.227 0.633∗∗∗ -0.225 0.633∗∗∗ -0.233 0.631∗∗∗
(0.139) (0.172) (0.139) (0.172) (0.139) (0.171) (0.139) (0.172) (0.139) (0.172)
Birth State Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1169 2152 1169 2152 1169 2152 1169 2152 1169 2152
R2 0.200 0.182 0.199 0.181 0.201 0.181 0.202 0.183 0.199 0.181
Notes: Clustered Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the birth state level.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Chapter 3
The Short-term Effects of the
Child Care Tax Credit on
Children’s Well-being
3.1 Introduction
The federal government of the United States introduced the Child Care Tax Credit (CCTC)
to the personal income tax code in 1976. The Child Care Tax Credit allows the parents to claim
a tax credit for their child care expenses if the parents are employed and incur child care service
expenses. As of 2019, the age limit for eligible children is 12 years old. At the federal level, parents
can claim 20 to 35 percent of their child care expenses up to $3,000 for one eligible child or $6,000 for
two or more eligible children according to family’s adjusted gross income. After the introduction of
the CCTC at the federal level, many states offered their own version of state level CCTC to provide
extra benefits for the working parents with young children. The States level CCTC vary in their
timing of enactments, amendments, benefits allowed, eligible family income threshold, etc.
There is evidence that the CCTC provides incentives for the mothers to join the labor
market. Michalopoulos et al. (1992), Leibowitz et al. (1992), and S. L. Averett et al. (1997) find
that the CCTC has a positive effect on mothers’ employment. In chapter one, I find that the CCTC
significantly increases the labor force participation rate of mothers, especially married ones. A $1,000
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increase in the CCTC increases the labor force participation rate by six percentage points. After the
mothers join the labor market, it is worth exploring what the effects of the CCTC are on children’s
well-being.
There could be multiple channels in which the CCTC can affect the well-being such as the
cognitive or non-cognitive development (or both) of the children. The first channel is through the
income effect. The CCTC reduces the cost of purchased child care services and encourages mothers
to work. It is plausible that mothers choose to join the labor force bring in more income for the
family. The income can provide more resources to the family for consumption and human capital
investment, which will help the development of the children. Without much doubt, the income effect
of the CCTC is presumably positive.
The second main channel is through the mother’s time reallocation effect. When a mother
spends more time working, there is less time she can spend with the children. Though the non-
maternal child care can be a substitute for maternal care at least for the basic child care needs,
it have different quality or intensity compared to that of the maternal care. Such a difference can
affect the well-being and development of the children. Plausibly, the time reallocation effect of the
CCTC could work on the opposite direction because the non-maternal child care is likely to be not
as intense as that of the maternal care.
Except for the two main channels, there could also be other channels in which the CCTC
can affect the children’s well-being. As a result, the total effect of the CCTC on children’s well-being
is ambiguous and is an empirical question that needs to be explored. In addition, the impact of the
CCTC on the children’s well-being can show in the short-term or it can last to their later lives. This
chapter focuses on the relatively short-term effects of the CCTC on the cognitive and non-cognitive
development of the children. This chapter tries to answer this question by performing a reduced
form analysis using state level CCTC legislative variation.
The data used in this paper are from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979
(NLSY79) and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 Child and Young Adult (NLSY79CY).
The NLSY79 surveys a cohort of ages 14-22 in 1979 and follow them over time. In 1986, the
NLSY79CY was started to survey and follow up the children of the NLSY79 female samples. The
combination and linkage of these two data sets make them suitable for this research in that they
provide a rich set of information both for the mothers and the children. The NLSY79CY has the
assessments on reading, mathematics, behavioral problems, and many other aspects of the children
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at different ages. I use the assessments carried out at early ages of eight or nine as the outcomes to
analyze the effects of the CCTC on children’s well-being and development. I link the child’s assess-
ments at ages 8-9 with the mother’s information through the NLSY mother-child linkage. Using the
data set I constructed for the CCTC legislative history (see details in Chapter One), I can assign
for all children the CCTC policy benefits exposure at their early ages. This allows me to analyze
the effect of the CCTC exposure at early ages on the well-being of the children.
Although the federal CCTC provides more benefits, it affects children of the same birth
cohorts in the same way. As a result, it does not provide enough identification power to the analysis.
However, there are a lot of variation in the state level CCTC. States enacted their state level CCTC
at different time, and they provide different levels of extra benefits in addition to the federal CCTC,
and some states change their state CCTC policy over time. The law changes at the state level can
be exploited to identify the effects of the CCTC on children’s well-being. For each individual child,
the enactment or amendments of the state CCTC legislation can be treated as exogenous shocks.
Theoretically, parents or families have influence on the policy through casting their votes. However,
there are many factors that can affect the voting behavior of the parents, and at the same time, there
are many random factors that affect the states to change the personal income tax code. Therefore,
it is safe to assume that the CCTC exposure at early ages is not correlated with the individual
characteristics. Under the assumption that the CCTC provides exogenous shocks, I use ordinary
least square (OLS) to estimate the effect of the CCTC on children’s well-being.
There is a rich pool of literature on the income effect of welfare and child care subsidy
programs on children’s well-being. For example, the Earned Income Tax Credit is a subsidy program
mainly assisting low-income families. It does not require a secondary earner in families with married
couples. As a result, the effect of the EITC can be interpreted as an income effect. Dahl and
Lochner (2012) use the exogenous policy shocks of the EITC as an instrumental variable and find a
positive effect of the family income on math and reading test scores. This effect is more pronounced
in children from disadvantaged families. Chetty et al. (2011), Maxfield (2014), and Manoli and
Turner (2018) find that the EITC increases the probability of children going to college. Bastian and
Michelmore (2018) find that exposure to more financial benefit from the EITC during teenage years
increases the probability of children graduating from high school and college. This exposure also has
a positive impact on the employment and earning ability of these children in adulthood. S. Averett
and Wang (2018) find that exposure to the EITC at early ages increases the family environment and
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the children’s health and non-cognitive ability. Using Norwegian data and exogenous policy shocks
of child care subsidy program, Black et al. (2014) find that being exposed to child care subsidy at
the age of five positively impacts the high school academic performances. The institutional setting
of the Norwegian child care subsidy program allows researchers to isolate the mechanism as an
income effect. Clark-Kauffman et al. (2003) also find that welfare policies that work as an earning
supplement have positive effects on academic achievement.
Relatively little literature focuses on subsidy programs with employment requirements for
both parents as the CCTC. In terms of the short-term effect of the child care subsidy on children’s
well-being, Baker et al. (2008) find that the universally accessible child care program in Quebec,
Canada led to higher rates of anxiety and behavioral problems. It also led to worse academic
performance and health condition. Herbst (2017) examine the long-term effect of the universal child
care program introduced by U.S. Lanham Act during World War II. He finds that kindergarten-aged
children affected by the Lanham Act are more likely to go to college and be employed in adulthood.
However, it is difficult to compare the results of a war-time policy to the many policies implemented
during peace periods. Fort et al. (2020) find one additional day care month at age 0–2 reduces
intelligence quotient by 0.5% (4.7% of a standard deviation) at age 8–14 in a relatively affluent
population.
This research contributes to the literature in that it is the first one to examine the effects of
the CCTC on children’s well-being. In the analysis, I construct variables for CCTC policy exposure
in the early ages, using the CCTC legislative history I document in my previous research (see Chapter
One for details). Focusing on samples from the NLSY79CY, I estimate the effects of CCTC exposure
in early ages on cognitive and non-cognitive development measured by the PIAT reading, the PIAT
mathematics, and behavior problem index around ages eight to nine. I find that CCTC exposure at
early ages negatively affects the reading recognition and reading comprehension score of the children.
A $1,000 increase of CCTC exposure at ages 1-4, decreases the PIAT reading recognition score by
2 points or one-seven of the standard deviation. The early ages CCTC exposure also decreases the
PIAT reading comprehension score by 1.3 points or one-tenth of the standard deviation. The effect
of the CCTC exposure on math is not as significant as that of the reading, but it also shows a
negative trend. There is also some evidence that the early ages exposure to the CCTC increases the
likelihood of developing behavioral problems. In terms of evaluation of the side-effect of the CCTC
on children’s well-being, no literature has explored this issue.
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This paper also contributes to the literature by providing new evidence on the relationship
between maternal employment and children’s well-being and educational achievement. In the strand
of literature focusing on the effects of maternal employment on early age educational achievement,
researchers find contradicting results. Desai et al. (1989) found that maternal employment has no
impact on a child’s Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (a test used to measure a child’s intellectual
development) score. Vandell and Ramanan (1992) find that early maternal employment is associated
with poor performance on tests for 8[U+2010]year[U+2010]old girls. Also, some researchers find
mixed results. Harvey (1999) finds that higher maternal work hours are associated with lower scores
at early ages but have no effect on older children’s scores. Using samples from the NLSY79 and a
fixed effect estimation, James-Burdumy (2005) finds that maternal work at age one of the children
has a negative effect on the PIAT math and reading scores; maternal work at age two of the children
has no effect on any of the scores; maternal work at age three of the children has a positive effect
on the PIAT math scores.
To confirm the channel of the effect, I run a placebo test which examines the effects of the
CCTC benefits variation before the child was born on children’s assessment at ages 8-9. The results
of the placebo test show that the variation in the CCTC benefits before the child was born has no
impact on the well-being of the children. Since the CCTC variation is measured at the state level,
the CCTC benefits before the child was born is not much different from that of the benefits after the
child was born. The fact that the policy variation before the child was born has no influence on the
children’s well-being provides evidence that it is through the channel of mother’s time reallocation
that the CCTC has an impact on the children’s well-being.
These results suggest that: although the CCTC reached its policy objective of encouraging
more mothers to join the labor market, it has some unexpected side effects that have the children’s
well-being worse off. It seems that the time reallocation effect of the mothers outweighs the income
effect of the CCTC. In this sense, this paper also contribute to the literature by providing evidence
on the relationship between the mother’s time allocation and children’s well-being.
3.2 Data
The samples used in this research are from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
1979 (NLSY79) and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 Child and Young Adult
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(NLSY79CY). The NLSY79 consists of individuals born between 1957 and 1964 as a national repre-
sentative cohort sample. The first interview was carried out for 12,686 individuals in 1979 when the
individuals were between 14 and 22 years old. The sample individuals are followed up with annually
from 1979 to 1994, and biennially after 1994 to present.1 The NLSY79 collects rich information from
the sample individuals about their family background, education, employment, income, marriage,
fertility, etc. I focus on the NLSY79 female samples, as they are the mothers who are impacted by
the CCTC, and the impact passes on to their children.
The NLSY79CY is a longitudinal project that follows the biological children of the female
samples in the NLSY79. The survey was carried out annually from 1986 to 1994, and biennially
after 1994 to present.2 As of 2016, 11,530 children born to NLSY79 mothers have been surveyed at
least once. The linkage between child samples from NLSY79CY and mother samples from NLSY79
allows me to relate measurement of the children’s well-being to mothers’ characteristics. Using the
information about the birth year and birth state, I can assign the state CCTC policy exposure to
the children at different ages.
To estimate the effects of the CCTC policy exposure at early ages on the children’s well-
being, I focus on the assessments of the NLSY79CY samples. Several assessments were carried out
according to appropriate ages of the child. Among all the assessments, the Peabody Individual
Achievement Test (PIAT) is a wide-range measure of academic achievement for children aged five
and above. The NLSY79CY includes three assessments from the PIAT: reading recognition, reading
comprehension, and mathematics. The PIAT reading recognition test measures word recognition
and pronunciation ability.3 The PIAT reading comprehension test measures a child’s ability to
derive meaning from sentences.4 The PIAT mathematics assessment measures a child’s attainment
in mathematics as taught in mainstream education. The NLSY79CY assessments also include the
behavior problems index, a widely used assessment regarding children’s behavioral problems.5
1 As of 2020, the latest release of NlSY79 is the 2016 wave.
2 As of 2020, the latest release of NlSY79CY is the 2016 wave.
3 According to the NLSY documentation: “the general objective of the reading recognition subtest is to measure
skills in translating sequences of printed alphabetic symbols which form words, into speech sounds that can be
understood by others as words. This subtest might also be viewed as an oral reading test. While it is recognized
that reading aloud is only one aspect of general reading ability, it is a skill useful throughout life in a wide range of
everyday situations in or out of school” (Dunn and Markwardt 1970: 19-20).
4 According to the NLSY documentation, the purpose of the PIAT reading comprehension test can be summarized
as: “While understanding the meaning of individual words is important, comprehending passages is more represen-
tative of practical reading ability since the context factor is built in, which plays an important role, not only in
deciphering the intended meaning of specific words, but of the total passage. Therefore, the format selected for the
reading subtest is one of a series of sentences of increasing difficulty.” (Dunn and Markwardt, 1970, pp. 21-22).
5 According to the NLSY documentation: “The behavior problem index is created by Nicholas Zill and James
Peterson to measure the frequency, range, and type of childhood behavior problems for children age four and over
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There are other assessments regarding different aspects of the children, but in this research
I focus on these four assessments mentioned above. They cover important aspects of the children’s
cognitive and non-cognitive development. Since I intend to examine the short-term effect of the
CCTC on children’s well-being, I choose assessments results derived at ages 8 or 9, because most
children had all the assessments results collected during these ages. Within each category of the
assessments, there are different measurement of the assessment. I choose the standard score of each
assessment. The educational and behavioral assessments chosen here at a relatively early age can
be a good predictor for the overall educational and behavioral performance in later years or even in
adulthood.
There is one limitation for the NLSY79 and NLSY79CY data sets. After the year 1994, the
survey was carried out every other year. The biennial manner of the survey causes the discontinuity
in the outcomes under examination and many other variables used as controls. The samples affected
the most by the discontinuity of the survey are those who were born after 1990. For the dependent
variables, such as the assessments of different ability and behavioral problems, I use the assessments
results collected at age eight whenever they are available. For the cases that the surveys were not
carried out when the children were eight years old, I use the assessments results collected at age
nine. The information about other control variables are also constructed with gaps for younger
cohorts. For those born in a year when no survey happened, I assign values to the variables with the
information derived from other years if they are time invariant or with a natural growth pattern.
For those information that is not predictable, I treat them as missing.
The variables measuring the CCTC policy exposure at early ages are always available even
under this discontinuous survey structure because they are derived from the state CCTC legislative
history. I collect the CCTC policy variation by reading the federal personal income tax code and
state personal income tax statutes. The details of this legislative information can be find in Chapter
One. The state CCTC policy can be very complicated and specific to each individual according to
family characteristics. However, in this research, I only use the most generous or coarse measurement
of the policy as the maximum state CCTC benefits allowed in a given state and in a given year. It
is usually the benefits allowed for families with two or more children and falling in the lower income
(Peterson and Zill 1986). It provides an evaluation on the following domains of a child: (1) antisocial behavior, (2)
anxiousness/depression, (3) headstrongness, (4) hyperactivity, (5) immature dependency, and (6) peer conflict/social
withdrawal. From 1986 through 2014, the Behavior Problems Index (BPI) was administered to NLSY79 mothers for
each of her children ages 4-14.”
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bracket. Such a coarse measurement of maximum state CCTC benefits make the treatment more
exogenous for each individual. Also, the variation of the policy is at the state-year level. Therefore,
as long as I know which year a child was born, I can assign the policy exposure to the child at
different ages. In this way, I construct the CCTC treatment variables.
Other useful information related to the child’s educational achievement includes the state
and year in which a child was born, the mother’s marital status at birth, the mother’s educational
attainment, and the income of the spouse of the mothers. I include children born between 1980 and
2006 from all 50 U.S. states and Washington D.C as my full sample.
All together, I can link 7,269 children with their mothers. When limited to children whose
mothers were between 23 to 45 years old, which is the working ages, there are 5,015 observations
left. I impute the time invariant or stable control variables for the mothers, but the employment and
income variables still have gaps in years when the survey did not take place. To avoid the problem
caused by the survey gap year, I choose to have controls that are measured at the age one of the
children. This further limits my sample to 4,087.6
Table 3.1 summarizes the variables used in the analysis. The assessments used in this
analysis are the PIAT reading recognition, the PIAT reading comprehension, the PIAT mathematics,
and the behavior problem index. These four assessments are among many assessments carried out
at different ages of the NLSY79CY sample individuals. Each of the assessments represents an aspect
of the development of the child. I choose the standardized score of the assessments; and the mean
of the four assessments are around 100 with a standard deviation around 14. There are 4,087
observations that have at least one of the assessments at ages 8-9 and have all the information for
control variables available. However, not all children took all the assessments at ages 8-9. The
number of observations having the assessments information is listed in the summary table as well.
The number of the observations available for each assessment limits the observations used in each
separate analysis.
Table 3.1 also shows summary statistics of the main control variables for the full sample.
The sample children were born between 1980 and 2006. Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of the
sample birth years. Females take 49.13% of the sample. The racial composition is 54% white, 19%
6 Here I explain how the survey gaps can influence the sample in the analysis. For example, after the year 1994, a
child born in a survey year will have the information about her mother at the year when the child was born, but will
lack the information about her mother at the year the child was one year old. Another child born in the gap year will
not have information about the mother at the year when the child was born, but have information about the mother
at the year when the child was one year old. As a result, when I look at the effect of the CCTC at early ages using
control variable from a giving age, I will lose some observations.
75
Hispanic, and 27% black. There are 71% of the children born in a family with both parents; and the
other 29% of the children were born in a single-mother family. The average age of the mothers is
28 when the children were born. On average, the mothers of the sample children attained 13 years
of education when the children were born. For married mothers, the average annual salary of their
spouse is $28,665 in 2015 dollar value.
The treatment variables are different measurements of the early ages exposure to state level
CCTC benefits. They represent the maximum allowable CCTC benefits for a family in a given
state and in a given year; and the values are inflation-adjusted using the 2015 dollar value. These
variables are created using the restricted Geocode of the NLSY and the CCTC legislative data set
described above. Conditional on offering the tax credit, the average value of the annual benefits
exposed by the children at ages 1-4 is around $900 to $1,000, with a standard deviation of around
$670. I also generate two variables indicating the sum of the benefits between ages 1-4 and ages 5-8,
which have a mean value around $3,300 - $3,700. Finally, I construct the total state CCTC policy
exposure from ages 1-8, which has a mean value of $6,046. Figures 3.2-3.5 show the distribution
of the dependent variables, and Figures 3.6-3.12 show the distribution of the treatment variables
conditional on positive values.
3.3 Empirical Strategy
In this research, I try to test the effect of the CCTC exposure at early ages. Therefore,
I choose the CCTC policy exposure at even younger ages as the treatment variables because I
can only look at what happened before the outcomes were observed to claim a causal relationship.
Additionally, a lot of research about the life cycle of the labor force participation of women shows
that: the female labor force participation rate stays high before giving birth to the child, drops
dramatically after giving birth to a child, and recovers gradually after that. After the child was
born, mothers decided whether or not to go back to work. The first a few years after the child was
born is one of the most important period of time when the CCTC plays a role and effects the relative
price of staying at home faced by these mothers.
Potentially, there are two main channels in which the CCTC affects the educational attain-
ment or behavioral problems of children. The marginal mothers choose to work and bring in more
income which help the development of the children. The tax credit also affects the mother’s time
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allocation. The change in the child care intensity also affects the development of the children. The
hypothesis compares two children with the same characteristics of mothers: one child was born in a
state and a year allowing CCTC benefits, and the other child was not. The mother of the first child
is more likely to join the labor market and spend less time with the child. All else equal, the first
child was exposed to more non-maternal and less intensive child care. The difference in the child
care characteristics and intensity affect the development of the child. Hypothetically, the mother’s
time allocation effect, which plausibly has a negative effect on the child’s development, can dominate
the income effect, which plausibly has a positive effect on the child’s development. The negative
total effect is probably greater when the children are at early ages, when the needs for child care
are more intense and when the mental development is more sensitive to stimulation (J. J. Heckman,
2000; J. J. Heckman, 2006). If the hypothesis is true, the CCTC is presumably negatively associated
with the assessments of the children.
To estimate the total effects of the early years CCTC policy exposure on children’s develop-
ment, I use the OLS estimation to test the hypothesis. Here, I propose the reduced form empirical
strategy denoted by
Yi = β0 + β1CCTCi + β2Xi + β3BirthStatei + β4BirthY eari + µi. (3.1)
The dependent variable Yi represents different assessments for a child i born in state s and
year t. It can be one of the four assessments mentioned above: the PIAT reading recognition score,
the PIAT reading comprehension score, the PIAT mathematics score, and behavioral problem index
score. The treatment variables CCTCi indicates the state CCTC exposure of the child when he or
she is at certain early ages. It measures the maximum allowable CCTC benefits at the year and
the state at a certain age of the child. I test the effects of the policy at ages one, two, three, and
four separately. I also test the effects of the policy using the sum of the age groups of 1-4 and 5-8
together. In the later case, the CCTCi represents a vector of two treatment variables. Moreover,
I test for the effects of the total state CCTC policy exposure from ages 1-8. The notation, Xi,
represents control variables including children’s gender, race, the mother’s age, the mother’s marital
status when the child was born, and the mother’s educational attainment at the year the child was
born, and the annual salary of the spouse of the mother if the mother was married, also measured
at the year the child was born. BirthStatei and BirthY eari are birth state and birth year fixed
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effects. The disturbance term is µi.
The coefficient of interest is β1. The CCTC treatment variables are measured at the state
level, which represents the policy treatment intensity received by individuals living in certain states
and years. Therefore, the treatment variables are not likely to be associated with the characteristics
of the individual child. The variation of the CCTC treatment variables is driven by exogenous shocks
of state level law changes. Under these exogenous shock assumptions, the CCTC treatment vari-
ables only affect the children’s educational assessments and behavioral problem assessment through
mothers’ time allocation adjustments. The CCTC treatment variable is continuous and indicates
the amount of benefits exposed to a child at a certain age. Using the ordinary least square (OLS)
estimation, I compare the academic or behavior problem assessments of children exposed to different
amount of CCTC benefits at an early age. Conditional on the year and the state of birth, the coef-
ficient β1 can be interpreted as the CCTC treatment effects on educational or behavioral problem
assessments at ages 8-9.
3.4 Results
Table 3.2 shows the results for the effects of CCTC exposure at early ages on the PIAT
reading recognition scores. The dependent variable is the PIAT reading recognition scores measured
at either eight years old or nine years old. Column 1 shows the results using the CCTC policy
exposure at one year old. Column 2, column 3, and column 4 report results using the CCTC policy
exposure at two, three, and four years old, respectively. The coefficient in column 1 of Table 3.2
means that: a $1,000 increase in CCTC exposure measured at age one decreases the PIAT reading
recognition score measured at ages 8-9 by 1.16 points. The effects derived from using the policy
exposure at two years old and three years old are greater and more significant, while the effect is
not significant using the policy exposure at four years old. Taking the estimation result from using
the policy variation at three years old as an example, the magnitude of the effect of CCTC exposure
is comparable to the difference between the children of white and Hispanic ethnicity.
In column 5 of Table 3.2, I use the sum of CCTC policy benefits exposure at ages 1-4
and ages 5-8 as the treatment variables. The results show that CCTC exposure at ages 1-4 has
a significant negative effect on the PIAT reading recognition score. The effect of CCTC exposure
at ages 5-8 turns to the positive sign but is not significantly different from zero. In terms of the
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magnitude, the coefficients in columns 1-4 and from column 5 are not comparable. The state level
policy is relatively stable on an annual basis. For results in columns 1-4, without controlling for the
variation of the other ages, the results cannot be interpreted as the effect of the CCTC exposure
only at that specific year. It is more of a representation of the policy exposure among the years close
to a given year. It is relatively more appropriate to interpret the magnitude of the effects using the
results from column 5. Column 5 mean a $1,000 annual increase in the CCTC exposure at the first
four years of life decreases the PIAT reading recognition score measured at eight years old by 0.6
points. Taking the mean value of the sum of CCTC exposure at the first four years, the accumulative
effect of the four years of exposure is about 2 points. To make sense of the magnitude, it is about
one-seventh of the standard deviation. Column 6 shows results using the total state CCTC policy
exposure from ages 1-8 as the treatment variable. The effect of the total policy exposure on PIAT
reading recognition is negative but the effect is not statistically significant.
In column 7 and column 8, I use CCTC exposure one year and two years before the child was
born as the treatment variable to perform a placebo test. The CCTC policy is relatively stable on a
year-to-year basis (Figure 3.13 and Figure 3.14 show the distribution of the CCTC policy exposure
one and two years before the child was born). As a result, for many people, the benefits from the
CCTC policy exposure could be similar in the years before and after the child was born. However,
with very similar treatment, the effect of policy exposure before the child was born has no effect on
the PIAT reading recognition score. The placebo test using policy exposure before the child was
born provides some evidence that the policy only plays its role by actually affecting mother’s time
allocation. It is through mothers’ time reallocation that the CCTC further affects the children’s
development.
Table 3.3 shows the effect of CCTC exposure at early ages on the PIAT reading compre-
hension score. The columns are similar, as are the cases in Table 3.2. The effects of CCTC policy
exposure at different ages all show negative coefficients. However, most of the effects are not sta-
tistically significant, except for the policy exposure at two years old. The coefficient in column 2 of
Table 3.3 can be interpreted as: a $1,000 increase in CCTC policy exposure at early ages decreases
the PIAT reading comprehension score measured at eight years old by 1.03 points. Similar to results
in Table 3.2, the sum of the policy exposure at ages 1-4 also shows significant negative effects on the
PIAT reading comprehension scores. Still, the results in column 5 and 6 are not directly comparable
to those in columns 1-4. Taking the mean value of the sum of CCTC exposure at the first four years,
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the results in column 5 can be interpreted as: the early ages CCTC exposure of an average benefits
value decreases the PIAT reading comprehension score by around 1.3 points. In another way, it
is about one-tenth of the standard deviation. The effect using the total CCTC policy exposure
from ages 1-8 is small and not significant. Additionally, the placebo test using the policy exposure
one or two years before the child was born shows no effect of the CCTC on the the PIAT reading
comprehension score.
Table 3.4 reports the estimation results for the effects of the CCTC exposure at early ages
on the PIAT math score. The dependent variable is the PIAT math score measured at either eight
years old or nine years old. Column 1 shows the results using the CCTC policy exposure when
the child was one year old. Columns 2-4 report results using the CCTC policy exposure at two,
three, or four years old, respectively. Most of the coefficients are not statistically significant after
clustering the standard errors at the birth state level, except for the coefficient in column 4, which
is marginally significant at 10% level. The coefficient for CCTC in column 4 shows that a $1,000
increase in the CCTC exposure measured at the state maximum level at early ages decreases the
PIAT math score at ages 8-9 by around one point. The coefficient of the column 5 using the sum of
the policy exposure at ages 1-4 and 5-8 shows no significant effect either. And the coefficient of the
column 6 using the total policy exposure from ages 1-8 is negative. However, the magnitude of the
estimated effect is small and not statistically different from zero.
Table 3.5 shows the results for the CCTC policy exposure at an early age on the behavior
problem index at ages 8-9. The columns are the same as in the estimation results tables above,
except that I do not include the results using policy exposure before the child was born. In most of
the columns, CCTC policy exposure has no significant effects on the behavior problem index score,
except for in column 5. In column 5, the policy treatment variables are the sum of the benefit
at these two age groups. The coefficients in column 5 show that the policy exposure at ages 1-4
has no effect on behavior problem index; however, the policy exposure at ages 5-8 is marginally
significant at the 10% level. It means that exposure to more benefits at ages 5-8 years old increases
the likelihood for the children to develop more behavioral problems. A $1,000 increase in the policy
exposure at ages 5-8 increase the behavior problem index by 0.36 points. Using the mean value of
the sum of the CCTC policy benefits in ages 5-8, the magnitude of the policy exposure is comparable
to the difference between the children of white and Hispanic ethnicity. Since most of the early years
exposure has no significant effect on behavior problem index score, it is not necessary to run the
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placebo tests.
In general, the estimation results show that the CCTC policy exposure at early ages has
negative effects on children’s well-being, as is measured by the PIAT reading, the PIAT mathematics,
and behavior problem index at ages 8-9.
3.5 Discussion
I further divide my sample according to the marital status of the mothers when the child
was born and perform the same OLS regression for the two subsamples. Tables 3.6-3.9 show the
results using the different assessments as the dependent variables. All columns include the same
control variables as in the main specifications in the last section: gender, race, the birth year fixed
effect, the birth state fixed effect, the mother’s education and age at birth, and the annual salary of
the spouse of the mother. I only report the results for the treatment variables to save space.
In Table 3.6, the dependent variable is the PIAT reading recognition score. Comparing
the odd-number columns with the even-number columns, it shows that the effect of the CCTC
early ages exposure on reading assessment is driven by children born into single-mother families.
Though the results also show negative effects for children born into two-parents families, none of the
effects are big or statistically different from zero. Similar results can be found for the PIAT reading
comprehension score in Table 3.7.
Table 3.8 shows the results for the PIAT mathematics score. The pattern for the mathe-
matics score is not as obvious as that of the reading assessments. None of the results are significant
once clustering the standard errors at the birth state level; however, all the coefficients for the early
ages CCTC policy exposure show negative values. Additionally, for some of the specifications the
coefficients for children of married mothers are greater than those for children of the single mothers.
Table 3.9 shows the results for the behavior problem index score. Most of the specifications
for children of the single mothers show positive but not significant effects, except for in column 6.
Column 6 shows that children of single mothers are more likely to develop behavior problems if they
are exposed to more benefits from the CCTC at early ages. Column 9 shows that the children of
married mothers are more likely to develop behavioral problems if they are exposed to more CCTC
benefit at ages 5-8. However, when using the total policy CCTC policy exposure from ages 1-8, the
effects are not significant.
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The above estimation results show that, in general, children exposed to more CCTC benefits
tend to be worse off. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that mother’s time reallocation
effects dominate the income effect of the tax credit; however, the estimation also shows that children
of single mothers are more subject to this negative effect, which needs to be further discussed. In the
sample used in this research, married mothers are more likely to be in the labor market than single
mothers. In this case, most of the married mothers are already in the labor market. As a result,
they are less likely to be affected by the subsidy policy. When comparing married mothers versus
single mothers, the employment pattern is different from the sample of the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID), which I use in Chapter one. The reason the NLSY shows different patterns needs
further examination.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, a reduced form analysis is used to estimate the effects of the early ages CCTC
exposure on children’s well-being. The analysis is based on the assumption that the variation of
the state-level CCTC benefits is caused by exogenous shocks of the CCTC law changes, as the law
changes are not likely to be correlated with individual characteristics. Based on the assumptions, I
test the channels in which the CCTC can affect the children’s cognitive or non-cognitive development
measured around eight years old by the PIAT reading recognition, the PIAT reading comprehension,
the PIAT mathematics, and behavior problem index scores. The results show that children exposed
to more CCTC benefits at early ages tend to have significantly lower PIAT reading scores. Also,
children are more likely to develop behavior problems if they had more CCTC policy benefits expo-
sure at ages 5-8, though the effect is only marginally significant in a statistical sense. Placebo tests
using CCTC policy variation measured before the child was born can help confirm the mechanism.
It is evident that the effects are more likely to through the channel of mother’s time reallocation.
Therefore, the mother’s time reallocation effect dominates the income effect of the CCTC policy.
This paper is the first to explore the side effects of the CCTC policy on children’s well-being. More
rigorous research are needed to further explore the heterogeneity effects across demographic groups,
and to explain why the effects are driven by children of the single mothers.
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Tables
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
N Mean Std Dev Min Max
Dependent variables:
PIAT Reading Recognition 3,758 105.70 (14.38) 68 135
PIAT Reading Comprehension 3,646 104.51 (13.35) 65 135
PIAT Math 3,765 102.47 (14.13) 65 135
Behavior Problem Index 3,883 103.72 (15.08) 76 149
Controll variables:
Female 4,087 49.13%
White 4,087 53.92%
Hispanic 4,087 19.33%
Black 4,087 26.74%
Birth Year 4,087 1980 2006
Mother’s married at birth 4,087 71.47%
Mother’s age at birth 4,087 28.07 (4.01) 23 45
Mother’s years of education 4,087 12.99 (2.39) 0 20
Mother’s spouse’s income at birth($ > 0) 2,713 28,665.53 (24,939.30) 17.00 266,687
Treatment variables:
State CCTC age 1 ($ > 0) 1,287 926.53 (682.27) 176.84 3,536.88
State CCTC age 2 ($ > 0) 1,294 936.24 (667.08) 223.98 3,441.55
State CCTC age 3 ($ > 0) 1,313 952.25 (672.52) 217.60 3,441.51
State CCTC age 4 ($ > 0) 1,293 990.95 (675.66) 217.61 3,441.51
Sum State CCTC ages 1-4 ($ > 0) 1,488 3,316.89 (2,563.57) 176.84 13,422.13
Sum State CCTC ages 5-8 ($ > 0) 1,504 3,721.14 (2,703.82) 217.60 12,879.90
Sum State CCTC ages 1-8 ($ > 0) 1,742 6,046.00 (5,024.46) 236.27 24,231.28
,
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Table 3.2: The Effects of the CCTC Exposure at Early Ages on the PIAT Reading Recognition
Score at Ages 8-9
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
State CCTC age 1 ($1000) -1.16
(0.54)
State CCTC age 2 ($1000) -1.29
(0.60)
State CCTC age 3 ($1000) -1.60
(0.76)
State CCTC age 4 ($1000) -0.84
(0.50)
Sum State CCTC ages 1-4 ($1000) -0.59
(0.22)
Sum State CCTC ages 5-8 ($1000) 0.23
(0.17)
Sum State CCTC ages 1-8 ($1000) -0.10
(0.08)
State CCTC age -1 ($1000) -1.00
(0.60)
State CCTC age -2 ($1000) 0.06
(0.46)
Female 3.33 3.32 3.34 3.33 3.34 3.32 3.34 3.29
(0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.46)
Hispanic -1.57 -1.58 -1.59 -1.57 -1.56 -1.58 -1.56 -1.57
(0.93) (0.93) (0.93) (0.93) (0.93) (0.92) (0.93) (0.94)
Black -4.32 -4.33 -4.34 -4.32 -4.33 -4.32 -4.33 -4.28
(0.77) (0.77) (0.76) (0.77) (0.77) (0.77) (0.77) (.077)
mother married 2.13 2.14 2.12 2.13 2.14 2.13 2.14 2.16
(0.66) (0.66) (0.66) (0.66) (0.65) (0.66) (0.65) (0.65)
Spouse income at birth ($1000) 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.030 0.029 0.030 0.029
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Birth Year Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Birth State Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Mother’s years of Edu Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 3,758 3,758 3,758 3,758 3,758 3,758 3,758 3,747
R2 0.212 0.213 0.213 0.212 0.213 0.212 0.213 0.211
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state of birth level.
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Table 3.3: The Effects of the CCTC Exposure at Early Ages on the PIAT Reading Comprehension
Score at Ages 8-9
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
State CCTC age 1 ($1000) -0.30
(0.53)
State CCTC age 2 ($1000) -1.03
(0.34)
State CCTC age 3 ($1000) -0.75
(0.55)
State CCTC age 4 ($1000) -0.31
(0.43)
Sum State CCTC ages 1-4 ($1000) -0.37
(0.14)
Sum State CCTC ages 5-8 ($1000) 0.22
(0.15)
Sum State CCTC ages 1-8 ($1000) -0.02
(0.08)
State CCTC age -1 ($1000) -0.72
(0.62)
State CCTC age -2 ($1000) 0.17
(0.55)
Female 2.25 2.54 2.54 2.54 2.55 2.25 2.54 2.51
(0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.40)
Hispanic -2.25 -2.27 -2.27 -2.25 -2.23 -2.25 -2.23 -2.30
(0.92) (0.92) (0.92) (0.92) (0.89) (0.91) (0.92) (0.92)
Black -4.29 -4.29 -4.30 -4.29 -4.29 -4.29 -4.29 -4.29
(0.72) (0.72) (0.72) (0.72) (0.72) (0.72) (0.72) (.73)
mother married 1.76 1.77 1.75 1.76 1.76 1.76 1.76 1.76
(0.64) (0.64) (0.64) (0.64) (0.63) (0.64) (0.64) (0.62)
Spouse income at birth ($1000) 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Birth Year Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Birth State Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Mother’s years of Edu Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 3,646 3,646 3,646 3,646 3,646 3,646 3,646 3,637
R2 0.209 0.209 0.209 0.209 0.209 0.209 0.209 0.209
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state of birth level.
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Table 3.4: The Effects of the CCTC Exposure at Early Ages on the PIAT Math Score at Ages 8-9
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
State CCTC age 1 ($1000) -1.21
(1.21)
State CCTC age 2 ($1000) -1.20
(0.82)
State CCTC age 3 ($1000) -0.87
(0.77)
State CCTC age 4 ($1000) -0.92
(0.56)
Sum State CCTC ages 1-4 ($1000) -0.47
(0.33)
Sum State CCTC ages 5-8 ($1000) 0.14
(0.17)
Sum State CCTC ages 1-8 ($1000) -0.10
(0.08)
State CCTC age -1 ($1000) -0.52
(0.62)
State CCTC age -2 ($1000) -0.25
(0.58)
Female -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.08
(0.41) (0.42) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.40)
Hispanic -4.41 -4.41 -4.41 -4.41 -4.40 -4.42 -4.38 -4.37
(0.66) (0.65) (0.65) (0.65) (0.65) (0.65) (0.65) (0.65)
Black -6.95 -6.97 -6.97 -6.96 -6.97 -6.96 -6.95 -6.92
(0.90) (0.89) (0.90) (0.90) (0.90) (0.90) (0.90) (.90)
mother married 2.06 2.06 2.05 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.03
(0.56) (0.56) (0.56) (0.56) (0.56) (0.56) (0.56) (0.55)
Spouse income at birth ($1000) 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Birth Year Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Birth State Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Mother’s years of Edu Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 3,765 3,765 3,765 3,765 3,765 3,765 3,765 3,754
R2 0.245 0.245 0.245 0.245 0.245 0.245 0.245 0.244
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state of birth level.
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Table 3.5: The Effects of the CCTC Exposure at Early Ages on Behavior Problem Index at Ages
8-9
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
State CCTC age 1 ($1000) -0.42
(0.96)
State CCTC age 2 ($1000) -0.29
(0.60)
State CCTC age 3 ($1000) 0.26
(0.71)
State CCTC age 4 ($1000) 0.15
(0.62)
Sum State CCTC ages 1-4 ($1000) -0.28
(0.21)
Sum State CCTC ages 5-8 ($1000) 0.36
(0.22)
Sum State CCTC ages 1-8 ($1000) 0.11
(0.11)
Female -2.59 -2.59 -2.59 -2.59 -2.57 -2.59
(0.59) (0.60) (0.59) (0.59) (0.60) (0.60)
Hispanic -1.26 -1.25 -1.24 -1.25 -1.22 -1.23
(0.66) (0.65) (0.65) (0.65) (0.65) (0.65)
Black 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04
(0.84) (0.84) (0.83) (0.84) (0.84) (0.84)
mother married -2.48 -2.47 -2.47 -2.48 -2.47 -2.48
(0.79) (0.79) (0.79) (0.79) (0.79) (0.79)
Spouse income at birth ($1000) -0.032 -0.032 -0.032 -0.032 -0.032 -0.032
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011)
Birth Year Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
Birth State Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
Mother’s years of Edu Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 3,883 3,883 3,883 3,883 3,883 3,883
R2 0.091 0.091 0.091 0.091 0.092 0.092
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state of birth level.
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Table 3.6: The Effects of the CCTC Exposure at Early Ages on the PIAT Reading Recognition Score at Ages 8-9 by Mather’s Marital
Status
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
married single married single married single married single married single married single
State CCTC age 1 ($1000) -0.85 -3.17
(0.59) (1.53)
State CCTC age 2 ($1000) -0.46 -4.24
(0.86) (1.42)
State CCTC age 3 ($1000) -0.54 -5.26
(0.84) (1.08)
State CCTC age 4 ($1000) -0.23 -3.06
(0.62) (0.83)
Sum State CCTC ages 1-4 ($1000) -0.36 -1.48
(0.30) (0.42)
Sum State CCTC ages 5-8 ($1000) 0.25 0.15
(0.26) (0.33)
Sum State CCTC ages 1-8 ($1000) 0.009 -0.47
(0.10) (0.15)
Birth Year Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Birth State Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Mother’s years of Edu Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 2,672 1,086 2,672 1,086 2,672 1,086 2,672 1,086 2,672 1,086 2,672 1,086
R2 0.187 0.239 0.187 0.243 0.187 0.247 0.187 0.241 0.188 0.244 0.187 0.241
Notes: Results for other control variables are neglected. They are gender, race, birth mother’s characteristics at birth as in Table 3.2-3.5, etc.
Clustered standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state of birth level.
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Table 3.7: The Effects of the CCTC Exposure at Early Ages on the PIAT Reading Comprehension Score at Ages 8-9 by Mather’s Marital
Status
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
married single married single married single married single married single married single
State CCTC age 1 ($1000) -0.34 -1.23
(0.55) (1.54)
State CCTC age 2 ($1000) -0.52 -2.89
(0.67) (1.41)
State CCTC age 3 ($1000) -0.07 -3.65
(0.70) (0.90)
State CCTC age 4 ($1000) -0.14 -1.92
(0.52) (0.88)
Sum State CCTC ages 1-4 ($1000) -0.20 -1.17
(0.29) (0.59)
Sum State CCTC ages 5-8 ($1000) 0.21 0.39
(0.27) (0.56)
Sum State CCTC ages 1-8 ($1000) 0.05 -0.20
(0.10) (0.20)
Birth Year Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Birth State Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Mother’s years of Edu Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 2,608 1,038 2,608 1,038 2,608 1,038 2,608 1,038 2,608 1,038 2,608 1,038
R2 0.184 0.235 0.184 0.238 0.184 0.240 0.184 0.236 0.185 0.239 0.184 0.235
Notes: Results for other control variables are neglected. They are gender, race, birth mother’s characteristics at birth as in Table 3.2-3.5, etc.
Clustered standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state of birth level.
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Table 3.8: The Effects of the CCTC Exposure at Early Ages on the PIAT Mathematics Score at Ages 8-9 by Mather’s Marital Status
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
married single married single married single married single married single married single
State CCTC age 1 ($1000) -1.42 -0.99
(1.36) (2.44)
State CCTC age 2 ($1000) -1.04 -2.05
(1.11) (1.43)
State CCTC age 3 ($1000) -0.83 -0.93
(0.92) (0.90)
State CCTC age 4 ($1000) -1.11 -0.46
(0.76) (1.03)
Sum State CCTC ages 1-4 ($1000) -0.48 -0.47
(0.48) (0.59)
Sum State CCTC ages 5-8 ($1000) 0.13 0.14
(0.27) (0.45)
Sum State CCTC ages 1-8 ($1000) -0.11 -0.09
(0.11) (0.20)
Birth Year Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Birth State Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Mother’s years of Edu Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 2,677 1,088 2,677 1,088 2,677 1,088 2,677 1,088 2,677 1,088 2,677 1,088
R2 0.219 0.195 0.219 0.196 0.219 0.195 0.219 0.195 0.219 0.195 0.218 0.195
Notes: Results for other control variables are neglected. They are gender, race, birth mother’s characteristics at birth as in Table 3.2-3.5, etc.
Clustered standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state of birth level.
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Table 3.9: The Effects of the CCTC Exposure at Early Ages on Behavior Problem Index Score at Ages 8-9 by Mather’s Marital Status
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
married single married single married single married single married single married single
State CCTC age 1 ($1000) -0.55 0.25
(1.27) (1.01)
State CCTC age 2 ($1000) -0.27 0.72
(1.11) (1.65)
State CCTC age 3 ($1000) -0.40 2.51
(1.04) (1.17)
State CCTC age 4 ($1000) -0.22 1.40
(0.91) (1.40)
Sum State CCTC ages 1-4 ($1000) -0.51 0.48
(0.31) (0.49)
Sum State CCTC ages 5-8 ($1000) 0.52 -0.01
(0.26) (0.27)
Sum State CCTC ages 1-8 ($1000) 0.10 0.18
(0.16) (0.19)
Birth Year Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Birth State Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Mother’s years of Edu Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 2,794 1,089 2,794 1,089 2,794 1,089 2,794 1,089 2,794 1,089 2,794 1,089
R2 0.083 0.083 0.219 0.151 0.083 0.153 0.083 0.152 0.085 0.151 0.083 0.151
Notes: Results for other control variables are neglected. They are gender, race, birth mother’s characteristics at birth as in Table 3.2-3.5, etc.
Clustered standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state of birth level.
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Figures
Figure 3.1: Distribution of Birth Year
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of the PIAT Reading Recognition Score
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of the PIAT Reading Comprehension Score
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Figure 3.4: Distribution of the PIAT Mathematics Score
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Figure 3.5: Distribution of the Behavior Problem Index Score
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Figure 3.6: Distribution of the State CCTC One Year Old
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Figure 3.7: Distribution of the State CCTC Two Years Old
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Figure 3.8: Distribution of the State CCTC Three Years Old
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Figure 3.9: Distribution of the State CCTC Four Years Old
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Figure 3.10: Distribution of the Sum of the State CCTC Ages 1-4
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Figure 3.11: Distribution of the Sum of the State CCTC Ages 5-8
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Figure 3.12: Distribution of the Sum of the State CCTC Ages 1-8
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Figure 3.13: Distribution of the State CCTC One Year Before the Birth of the Child
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Figure 3.14: Distribution of the State CCTC Two Years Before the Birth of the Child
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Appendices
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Appendix A The Federal CCTC History
Statute: 26 USCS § 21
• 1976-1981: 20% of the expenses up to $2000 for one eligible child, or $4000 for two or more
eligible children.
• 1982-2002: Up to 30% of the expenses up to $2400 for one eligible child, or $4800 for two
or more eligible children; the applicable rate reduces by 1 percent for every $2000 additional
family AGI.
Table A1: The Federal CCTC applicable rate and maximum credit, 1982-2002
AGI Applicable Rate max for 1 child max for 2+ children
$0-$10,000 30% $720 $1440
$10,001-$12,000 29% $696 $1392
$12,001-$14,000 28% $672 $1344
$14,001-$16,000 27% $648 $1296
$16,001-$18,000 26% $624 $1248
$18,001-$20,000 25% $600 $1200
$20,001-$22,000 24% $576 $1152
$22,001-$24,000 23% $552 $1104
$24,001-$26,000 22% $528 $1056
$26,001-$28,000 21% $504 $1008
$28,001+ 20% $480 $960
• 2003-2015: See Table 1.
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Appendix B State Statutes of Child Care Tax Credit
“Making Care Less Taxing” of the National Women’s Law Center has a list of the state
CCTC statutes and some details of the state CCTC for a few recent cross-sectional years (Campbell
et al., 2011). Appendix A is adopted from this report.
Table A2: the State CCTC Legislation
state state child care tax credit legislation
Alaska Alaska Stat. § 43.20.013
Arkansas Ark. Code Ann. § 26-51-502
California Cal. Ann. Rev. & Tax Code § 17052.6
Colorado Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-22-119
Delaware Del. Code Ann. tit. 30, § 1114
District of Columbia D.C. Code § 47-1806.04(c)
Georgia Ga. Code Ann. § 48-7-29.10
Hawaii Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 235-55.6
Iowa Iowa Code Ann. § 422.12C
Kansas Kan. Stat. Ann. § 79-32, 111a
Kentucky Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 141.067
Louisiana La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 47:297.4
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 47:6104
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 47:297.2
Maine Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit 36, § 5218
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Table A3: the State CCTC Legislation continue
Maryland Md. Code Ann., Tax-Gen. § 10-716
Md. Code Ann., Tax-Gen. § 10-208(e)
Md. Code Ann., Tax-Gen. § 10-207
Minnesota Minn. Stat. Ann. § 290.067
Nebraska Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 77-2715.07(2)(a), (b)
New Mexico N.M. Stat. Ann. § 7-2-18.1
New York N.Y. Tax Law § 606(c)
North Carolina N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-151.11
Ohio Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5747.054
Oklahoma Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 68, § 2357(B)(2)
Oregon ORS 316.078
ORS 315.262
Rhode Island R.I. Gen. Laws § 44-30-2.6(K)(2)
South Carolina S.C. Code Ann. § 12-6-3380
Vermont Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, § 5822(d)
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, § 5811(4)
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, § 5828c
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Appendix C State Child Care Tax Credit Calculation For-
mula
Without further notice, the information is collected from the Nexis Uni database. Other
sources of information are listed in the footnotes. For those information collected directly from the
state library or state law library, readers can request the original documents from the author or
request from the libraries mentioned. If the organized information listed here seems complicated,
the process of collecting the information is more tedious than it seems to be. Even for states that
have very little variation in the CCTC legislation, I have to go back to all the legislative history to
verify that there is no change through the years. I try my best to make this dataset as clear and
accurate as possible, but I cannot be one hundred percent sure that there is no error. If any one
finds anything wrong with the information, I highly appreciate that you point it out by contacting
me at haibinj@clemson.edu.
Alaska
• 1980-1986: CCTCfed × 16%
• 1987-1994: 0
• 1995-2015: CCTCfed × 16%
Arkansas7
• 1977-1996: CCTCfed × 10%, non-refundable.
• 1997-2015: CCTCfed × 20%, non-refundable.
California8
• 1977-1992: refundable.
• 1993-1999: repealed
7 Thanks Lynn Valetutti and Natalie Marlin from Arkansas State Library for providing me with the photocopy of
the original legislation documents.
8 The information of California state CCTC is from the report of California Legislative Analysist’s Office on April
7, 2016, “Options for Modifying the State Child Care Tax Credit.”
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• 2000-2010: refundable.
• 2011-2015: non-refundable.
1977-1982 1983-1984* 1985-1986 1987-1989
$0-$20,000 CCTCfed × 30% CCTCfed × 15% CCTCfed × 10% CCTCfed × 30%
$20,001 + 0 0 CCTCfed × 5% CCTCfed × 30%
1990-1992 1993-1999 2000-2002 2003-2015
$0-$40,000 CCTCfed × 30% 0 CCTCfed × 63% CCTCfed × 50%
$40,001-$70,000 CCTCfed × 25% 0 CCTCfed × 53% CCTCfed × 43%
$70,001-$100,000 CCTCfed × 20% 0 CCTCfed × 42% CCTCfed × 34%
$100,001 + CCTCfed × 15% 0 0 0
notes:* During 1983 to 1984, the state CCTC is set to three percent of the expenses used
to calculate the federal CCTC, which is equivalent to 10-15 percent of the federal CCTC.
Colorado
• 1996-2015: refundable.
1996-2015
0-$25,000 CCTCfed × 50%
$25,001-$35,000 CCTCfed × 30%
$35,001-$60,000 CCTCfed × 10%
$60,001+ 0
Colorado has another CCTC regulation, which is conditional on state excess revenue.
• 1998-1999:
If the state has excess revenue, all families with income less than $60,000 can claim the bigger
of 50% of the federal CCTC or $200. But this was not activated during 1998-1999.
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• 2000-2010:
If the state has excess revenue, all families with income less than $64,000 can claim the bigger
of 70% of the federal CCTC or $300, but it was only activated in the year 2000 and 2001. From
2002 onward, Child Care Tax Credit had no longer been listed in the refund mechanism.9
Delaware
• 1987-1988: CCTCfed × 25%, non-refundable.
• 1989-2015: CCTCfed × 50%, non-refundable.
District of Columbia10
• 1978-1982: 6% of the expenses used to calculate the federal CCTC, which is equivalent to 30%
of the federal CCTC, non-refundable.
• 1983-1988: CCTCfed × 30%, non-refundable.
• 1989-2015: CCTCfed × 32%, non-refundable.
Georgia
• 2006: CCTCfed × 10%, non-refundable.
• 2007: CCTCfed × 20%, non-refundable.
• 2008-2015: CCTCfed × 30%, non-refundable.
Hawaii
• 1977-1980: 5% of the expenses up to $2000 for one child, $4000 for two or more children, but
limited to the actual expenses and the (lower) income of parent(s).
• 1981: 10% of the expenses up to $2000 for one child, $4000 for two or more children, but
limited to the actual expenses and the (lower) income of parent(s).
9 https://www.sos.state.co.us/CCR/GenerateRulePdf.do?ruleVersionId=8043fileName=1%20CCR%20201-2
10 The legislation can be found from the website of D.C. Law Library:
https://code.dccouncil.us/dc/council/code/sections/47-1806.04.html
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• 1982-1989: applicable percent of the expenses according to earned income. The expenses is
up to $2400 for one eligible child or $4800 for two or more eligible children, but limited to the
actual expenses and the (lower) income of parent(s).
AGI persent of the expenses
$0 - $10,000 15 %
$10,001 - $12,000 14 %
$12,001 - $14,000 13 %
$14,001 - $16,000 12 %
$16,001 - $18,000 11 %
$18,001 + 10 %
• 1990-2015: applicable percent of the expenses according to earned income. The expenses are
up to $2400 for one eligible child or $4800 for two or more eligible children, but limited to the
actual expenses and the (lower) income of parent(s).
AGI persent of the expenses
$0 - $10,000 25 %
$10,001 - $12,000 24 %
$12,001 - $14,000 23 %
$14,001 - $16,000 22 %
$16,001 - $18,000 21 %
$18,001 - $20,000 20 %
$20,001 - $22,000 19 %
$22,001 - $24,000 18 %
$24,001 - $26,000 17 %
$26,001 - $28,000 16 %
$28,001 + 15 %
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Iowa11
• 1977-1982: CCTCfed × 5%, non-refundable.
• 1983-1985: CCTCfed × 10%, non-refundable.
• 1986-1989: CCTCfed × 45%, non-refundable.
• 1990-2015: refundable.
1990-1992 1993-2005 2006-2015
$0-$10,000 CCTCfed × 75% CCTCfed × 75% CCTCfed × 75%
$10,001-$20,000 CCTCfed × 65% CCTCfed × 65% CCTCfed × 65%
$20,001-$25,000 CCTCfed × 55% CCTCfed × 55% CCTCfed × 55%
$25,001-$35,000 CCTCfed × 50% CCTCfed × 50% CCTCfed × 50%
$35,000-$40,000 CCTCfed × 40% CCTCfed × 40% CCTCfed × 40%
$40,001-$45,000 CCTCfed × 30% 0 CCTCfed × 30%
$45,001-$50,000 CCTCfed × 20% 0 0
$50,001+ CCTCfed × 10% 0 0
Kansas
• 1978-1988: 10-100% of the federal CCTC, non-refundable.
• 1989-2012: CCTCfed × 25%, non-refundable.
• 2013-2015: repealed.
11 Man Jia and Bob Rogers, Tax Research and Program Analysis Section Iowa Department of Revenue, “Iowa’s Child
and Dependent Care Tax Credit and Early Childhood Development Tax Credit—Tax Credits Program Evaluation
Study”
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1978-1988 1989-2012
$0-$5,000 CCTCfed × 100% CCTCfed × 25%
$5,001-$6,000 CCTCfed × 90% CCTCfed × 25%
$6,001-$7,000 CCTCfed × 80% CCTCfed × 25%
$7,001-$8,000 CCTCfed × 70% CCTCfed × 25%
$8,000-$9,000 CCTCfed × 60% CCTCfed × 25%
$9,001-$10,000 CCTCfed × 50% CCTCfed × 25%
$10,001-$11,000 CCTCfed × 40% CCTCfed × 25%
$11,001-$12,000 CCTCfed × 30% CCTCfed × 25%
$12,001-$13,000 CCTCfed × 20% CCTCfed × 25%
$13,001-$14,000 CCTCfed × 10% CCTCfed × 25%
$14,001 + 0 CCTCfed × 25%
Kentucky
1990 - 2015: CCTCfed × 20%, non-refundable.
Louisiana12
2003-2015: refundable for income lower than $25,000, or can be carried to next year.
2003-2005 2006 2007-2015
$0-$25,000 CCTCfed × 50% CCTCfed × 25% CCTCfed × 50%
$25,001-$35,000 CCTCfed × 30% CCTCfed × 30% CCTCfed × 30%
$35,001-$60,000 CCTCfed × 10% CCTCfed × 10% CCTCfed × 10%
$60,001 + min{CCTCfed × 10%, $25} min{CCTCfed × 10%, $25} min{CCTCfed × 10%, $25}
12 La. Rev. Stat. Ann.§47:297.2 allows 100 percent of the federal CCTC for dependents who are physically or
mentally incapable taking care of themselves. La. Rev. Stat. Ann.§47:6104 allows a tax credit that equals 50-200
percent of the federal CCTC for quality early child care, according to the rating of the child care facility. Since there
is no information of the incapability and the quality of early child care choice, I only consider the basic state CCTC
according to La. Rev. Stat. Ann.§47:297.4
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Maine13
• 1987: CCTCfed × 20%, non-refundable.
• 1988-2000: CCTCfed × 25%, non-refundable.
• 2001-2002: CCTCfed × 25%, refundable up to $500.
• 2003-2005: CCTCfed × 21.5%, refundable up to $500.
• 2006-2015: CCTCfed × 25%, refundable up to $500.
( From 2001 to 2015, there is another regulation allows double the credit for quality child care,
but since it is not possible to know the details of the child care quality, this piece of information
is not used in the study.)
Maryland14
2001-2015: non-refundable.
• for married:
2001-2015
$0-$41,000 CCTCfed × 32.5%
$41,001-$42,000 CCTCfed × 29.25%
$42,001-$43,000 CCTCfed × 26%
$43,000-$44,000 CCTCfed × 22.75%
$44,001-$45,000 CCTCfed × 19.5%
$45,001-$46,000 CCTCfed × 16.25%
$46,001-$47,000 CCTCfed × 13%
$47,001-$48,000 CCTCfed × 9.75%
$48,001-$49,000 CCTCfed × 6.5%
$49,001-$50,000 CCTCfed × 3.25%
50,001+ 0
13 The history of the legislation is not complete at Nexis Uni database, but it can be found at Maine State
Legislature: https://www.maine.gov/legis/lawlib/lldl/open.htm
14 Maryland also has a tax deduction for child care expenses, specified in Md. Code Ann., Tax-Gen.§10-208(e) and
Md. Code Ann., Tax-Gen.§10-207
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• for single or married file separately:
2001-2015
$0-$20,500 CCTCfed × 32.5%
$20,501-$21,000 CCTCfed × 29.25%
$21,001-$21,500 CCTCfed × 26%
$21,500-$22,000 CCTCfed × 22.75%
$22,001-$22,500 CCTCfed × 19.5%
$22,501-$23,000 CCTCfed × 16.25%
$23,001-$23,500 CCTCfed × 13%
$23,501-$24,000 CCTCfed × 9.75%
$24,001-$24,500 CCTCfed × 6.5%
$24,501-$25,000 CCTCfed × 3.25%
$25,001+ 0
Minnesota15
• 1977-1980: refundable, limited to $150 for one or $300 for two or more children.
For one eligible child:
AGI ≤ $12,000 : CCTCfed × 50%,
$12,000 < AGI ≤ $15,000 : CCTCfed × 50%− (AGI − 12, 000)× 0.05 ,
AGI > $15,000 : 0 .
For two or more eligible children:
AGI ≤ $12,000 : CCTCfed × 50%,
$12,000 < AGI ≤ $18,000 : CCTCfed × 50%− (AGI − 12, 000)× 0.05 ,
AGI > $18,000 : 0 .
• 1981-1982: refundable, limited to $400 for one or $800 for two or more children. For one
eligible child :
AGI ≤ $15,000 : CCTCfed × 100%,
$15,000 < AGI ≤ $23,000 : CCTCfed × 100%− (AGI − 15, 000)× 0.05 ,
AGI > $23,000 : 0 .
15 The Minnesota CCTC legislation history can be found at https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/cite/290.067
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For two or more eligible children:
AGI ≤ $15,000 : CCTCfed × 100%,
$15,000 < AGI ≤ $31,000 : CCTCfed × 100%− (AGI − 15, 000)× 0.05 ,
AGI > $31,000 : 0 .
• 1983: refundable., limited to $720 for one or $1440 for two or more children.
AGI one child two or more children
0 - $10,000 min{CCTCfed × 100%, $720} min{CCTCfed × 100%, $1440}
$10,001 - $11,000 min{CCTCfed × 100%, $670} min{CCTCfed × 100%, $1340}
$11,001 - $12,000 min{CCTCfed × 100%, $620} min{CCTCfed × 100%, $1240}
$12,001 - $13,000 min{CCTCfed × 100%, $570} min{CCTCfed × 100%, $1140}
$13,001 - $15,000 min{CCTCfed × 100%, $520} min{CCTCfed × 100%, $1040}
$15,001 - $22,000 min{CCTCfed × 100%, $400} min{CCTCfed × 100%, $800}
−(AGI − 15000)× 0.05 + $70 −(AGI − 15000)× 0.05 + $70
$22,001 - $23,000 min{CCTCfed × 100%, $70} min{CCTCfed × 100%, $140}
$23,001 - $24,000 min{CCTCfed × 100%, $20} min{CCTCfed × 100%, $40}
$24,001 + 0 0
• 1984-1986: refundable.
AGI one child two or more children
0-$10,000 min{CCTCfed × 100%, $720} min{CCTCfed × 100%, $1440}
$10,001-$11,000 min{CCTCfed × 100%, $660} min{CCTCfed × 100%, $1320}
$11,001-$24,000 min{CCTCfed × 100%, $660} min{CCTCfed × 100%, $1320}
−(AGI − 11000)× 0.05∗ −(AGI − 11000)× 0.1∗∗
$24001+ 0 0
note: * reduce by $10 for every $200 for one.
note: ** reduce by $20 for every $200 for two or more.
• 1987-1988: refundable.
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AGI one child two or more children
0-$12,200 min{CCTCfed × 100%, $720} min{CCTCfed × 100%, $1440}
$12,201-$24,000 min{CCTCfed × 100%, $720} min{CCTCfed × 100%, $1440}
−(AGI − 12200)× 0.06∗ −(AGI − 12200)× 0.12∗∗
$24001+ 0 0
note: * reduce by $12 for every $200 for one.
note: ** reduce by $24 for every $200 for two or more.
• 1989-1999: refundable, the threshold ($13351) began to be adjusted to inflation from 1991.
AGI one child two or more children
0-$13,350 min{CCTCfed × 100%, $720} min{CCTCfed × 100%, $1440}
$13,351+ min{CCTCfed × 100%, $720} min{CCTCfed × 100%, $1440}
−(AGI − 13351)× 0.0514∗ −(AGI − 13351)× 0.1029∗∗
$27351+ 0 0
note: * reduce by $18 for every $350 for one.
note: ** reduce by $36 for every $350 for two or more.
• 2000-2015: refundable, the threshold to be adjusted to inflation.
AGI one child two or more children
0-$18,040 min{CCTCfed × 100%, $720} min{CCTCfed × 100%, $1440}.
$18,040+ min{CCTCfed × 100%, $720} min{CCTCfed × 100%, $1440}
−(AGI − 18040)× 0.0514∗ −(AGI − 18040)× 0.1029∗∗
$32041+ 0 0
note: * reduce by $18 for every $350 for one.
note: ** reduce by $36 for every $350 for two or more.
Nebraska
• 1989-1997: non-refundable.
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• 1998-2015: refundable for income below $29,000.
1989-1997 1998-2015
$0-$22,000 CCTCfed × 25% CCTCfed × 100%
$22,001-$23,000 CCTCfed × 25% CCTCfed × 90%
$23,001-$24,000 CCTCfed × 25% CCTCfed × 80%
$24,000-$25,000 CCTCfed × 25% CCTCfed × 70%
$25,001-$26,000 CCTCfed × 25% CCTCfed × 60%
$26,001-$27,00 CCTCfed × 25% CCTCfed × 50%
$27,001-$28,000 CCTCfed × 25% CCTCfed × 40%
$28,001-$29,000 CCTCfed × 25% CCTCfed × 30%
$29,001 + CCTCfed × 25% CCTCfed × 25%
New Mexico 16
1981-2015: 40% of the expenses, up to $480 for one child, $960 for two children, or $1200
for more than two children, and minus the federal CCTC.
Eligible family has income no more than double the federal minimum wage salary. The eligibility is
calculated by doubling the product of federal minimum wage and the 2080 hours per year.17
New York
• 1977-1995: CCTCNY = CCTCfed × 20% , non-refundable.
• 1996-2015: refundable.
• 1996:
For a family with NYAGI less than $14,000:
CCTCNY = CCTCfed × (20% + 10%
min{4000, 14000−NY AGI}
4000
),
,
For a family with NYAGI more than $14,000: CCTCNY = CCTCfed × 20%.
16 Thank Katherine Miles from New Mexico State library for providing the photo copy of the legislation document.
17 source: U.S. Department of labor https://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/chart.htm
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• 1997:
For a family with NYAGI ≤ $14,000:
CCTCNY = CCTCfed × (20% + 40%
min{4000, 14000−NY AGI}
4000
),
,
For a family with NYAGI more than $14,000: CCTCNY = CCTCfed × 20%.
• 1998:
For a family with NYAGI less than $30,000:
CCTCNY = CCTCfed × (20% + 80%
min{13000, 30000−NY AGI}
13000
),
For a family with NYAGI more than $30,000: CCTCNY = CCTCfed × 20%.
• 1999-2015:
For a family with NYAGI less than $40,000:
CCTCNY = CCTCfed × (100% + 10%
min{15000, 40000−NY AGI}
15000
),
For a family with NYAGI more than $40,000:
CCTCNY = CCTCfed × (20% + 80%
min{15000, 60000−NY AGI}
15000
),
.
North Carolina
• 1981-1984: 7% of the expenses up to $2000 for one child or $4000 for two or more children
under 15, non-refundable.
• 1985-1988: 7% of the expenses up to $2400 for one child or $4800 for two or more children
under 15, non-refundable.
• 1989-1993: non-refundable. Child older than 7 and younger than 15: 7% of the expenses up
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to $2400 for one child or $4800 for two or more children.
Child younger than 7: 10% of the expenses up to $2400 for one child or $4800 for two or more
children.
• 1994-2005: the expenses is up to 2400 for one child or 4800 for two or more children, non-
refundable.
– married:
children 7-15 years old children 0-6 years old
$0-$25,000 9% of the expenses 13% of the expenses
$25,001-$40,000 8% of the expenses 11.5% of the expenses
$40,001 + 7% of the expenses 10% of the expenses
– single:
children 7-15 years old children 0-6 years old
$0-$15,000 9% of the expenses 13% of the expenses
$15,001-$24,000 8% of the expenses 11.5% of the expenses
$24,001 + 7% of the expenses 10% of the expenses
– household head
children 7-15 years old children 0-6 years old
$0-$20,000 9% of the expenses 13% of the expenses
$20,001-$32,000 8% of the expenses 11.5% of the expenses
$32,001 + 7% of the expenses 10% of the expenses
• 2006-2013: the schedules are the same with those of 1994-2005, except for that the expenses
are up to 3000 for one child or 6000 for two or more children, non-refundable.
• 2014-2015: repealed.
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Ohio
• 1988-1992: CCTCfed × 25%, family income below $30,000; non-refundable.
• 1993-2015: non-refundable.
1993-1996 1997-2015
$0-$20,000 CCTCfed × 35% CCTCfed × 100%
$20.000-$40,000 CCTCfed × 25% CCTCfed × 25%
$40,000 + 0 0
OKlahoma
1976-2015: non-refundable.
2007-2015: a taxpayer can choose the higher of 20% of the federal child care tax credit, or 5% of the
federal child tax credit.
1976-2007 2008-2015
$0-$100,000 CCTCfed × 20% CCTCfed × 20%
$100,000 + CCTCfed × 20% 0
Oregon18
• 1976-1988: CCTCfed × 40%, non-refundable.
• 1989-2015: non-refundable,
18 Thank Jerry Curry, Jey Wann, and Claire Bolyard from State Library of Oregon for providing the legislation
document.
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family income percent of the expenses†
$0-$5,000 30%
$5,000-$10,000 15%
$10,000-$15,000 8%
$15,000-$25,000 6%
$25,000-$35,000 5%
$35,000-$45,000 4%
$45,000 + 0
†The expenses are the one used to calculate the federal CCTC.
Oregon has another child care tax credit for low income families according to ORS § 315.262,
described as follows, but there is no dollar limit for this regulation. It is hard to assign
a maximum state or individual CCTC by incorporating this law. But the results derived
without the additional tax credit attenuate the effects of the CCTC on maternal labor supply.
• 1997-2000, non-refundable.
AGI AS Percent of Applicable Percentage
Federal Poverty Level of the Expenses
0 - 150% 40
151% - 160% 36
161% - 170% 32
171% - 180% 24
181% - 190% 16
190% - 200% 8
201% + 0
• 2001-2015, non-refundable.
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AGI AS Percent of Applicable Percentage
Federal Poverty Level of the Expenses
0 - 200% 40
201% - 210% 36
211% - 220% 32
221% - 230% 24
231% - 240% 16
240% - 250% 8
251% + 0
• 2003-2015, same brackets and applicable rates, refundable. Added another limitation of less
than the income that equals 1040 hours at the minimum wage established under ORS 653.02519.
Rhode Island
• 2001: CCTCfed × 25.5%, non-refundable.
• 2002-2015: CCTCfed × 25%, non-refundable.
South Carolina
1995 - 2015: (expenses used to calculate federal CCTC)× 7% , non-refundable.
This equals to as low as 20% of the federal CCTC for those apply the highest percentage for the
federal CCTC (35%) to as high as 35% of the federal CCTC for those apply the lowest percent for
the federal CCTC (20%).
Vermont
• 1976-2015: CCTCfed × 24%, non-refundable.
• low income child care tax credit, 2003-2015:
19 The poverty line information is from https://aspe.hhs.gov/prior-hhs-poverty-guidelines-and-federal-register-
references
125
single : income below $30,000, CCTCfed × 50%, refundable;
married : income below $40,000, CCTCfed × 50%, refundable.
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Appendix D The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is a subsidy policy aiming at low-income families.
The federal EITC came into effect in 1976. After the enactment of the federal EITC, some states also
provided a state-level EITC. The EITC and the CCTC have overlapping benefit recipients and time
of effectiveness. However, the EITC has some significant differences from the CCTC. For instance,
the EITC does not require the secondary earner of a family. As long as one of the parents has earned
income falling into certain income bracket, the family is eligible for EITC. However, EITC phases
out entirely after the family income reaches a certain level, while CCTC does not. Also, EITC is
refundable. I collect the legislative history of the federal EITC and adopt the state EITC history
documented by Shapiro (2019) from National Bureau of Economic Research. I code the state-level
EITC and the individual EITC control variables in a similar way as the CCTC treatment variables.
See on-line appendix for details.
To calculate the state-year EITC treatment variable, I first collect the information for the
maximum level of the federal EITC that is allowable for a two-children family from 1976 to 2015.
Since most states set their state EITC as a proportion of the federal EITC one claimed, so I just
multiply the federal EITC with the match-up rate in a state and a year. The information I use for
the state EITC match-up rate is that of Daniel Feenberg from NBER.20 By doing this, I construct
a state-year EITC treatment variable indicating the maximum EITC for a two-children family in a
state and a year.
The second variable I construct is an individual EITC treatment variable. In coding this
variable, I use individual characteristics as of number of children under 18 years old and husband
income for married women. The EITC varies greatly according to number of children and family
income. I first calculate the maximum federal EITC a woman can claim regardless of her actual
labor supply. For example, the federal EITC in recent years first increases with the family income,
keeps flat for an extra income level, and then starts to decrease when family income reaches a phase-
out level. In my coding, if a woman whose husband has an annual income that is lower than the
phase-out level, I assign the woman with the maximum allowable EITC, though she might work to
the level that the family falls in the income range of phasing out. If her husband has an annual
20 https://users.nber.org/taxsim/state-eitc.html, California EITC is according to
https://www.ftb.ca.gov/file/personal/credits/california-earned-income-tax-credit.html
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income that is at the phasing-out range, I just calculate the EITC using the husband income and
number of children, assuming the woman has no income, this gives the maximum EITC for this
woman. And if her husband makes an annual income that is beyond the phase-out level, then the
woman can not claim any EITC regardless of her labor supply, I just assign zero to her individual
EITC treatment variable. Finally, I multiply the federal EITC with the state match-up rate to
get the individual state EITC.21 By doing this, I construct an individual EITC treatment variable
indication the maximum level of the state EITC a woman can claim, given the number of children
she has and earned income of her husband if she is married.
21 Except for the case of Minnesota, because Minnesota has a Working Family Credit that is similar with the EITC,
but it is not set as a proportion of the federal EITC. I calculate the Minnesota EITC using the method similar with
the individual federal EITC.
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Appendix E The Federal EITC Variation
• 1976-1978: for families with children, 10% of the first $4000 of income, reduced by 10% for
income higher than $4000.
• 1979-1984: for families with children, 10% of the first $5000 of income, reduced by 12.5% for
income higher than $6000.
• 1985-1986: for families with children, 11% of the first $5000 of income, reduced by 12% for
income higher than $6500.
• 1987-1990: for families with children, 14% of the first $5714 of income, reduced by 10% for
income higher than $9000. And the numbers $5714 and $9000 are inflation adjusted using
1987 price level.
• 1991: for families with one child, 16.7% of the first $5714 of income, reduced by 11.93% for
income higher than $9000; for families with two or more children, 17.3% of the first $5714 of
income, reduced by 12.36% for income higher than $9000. And the numbers $5714 and $9000
are inflation adjusted using 1987 price level.
• 1992: for families with one child, 17.6% of the first $5714 of income, reduced by 12.57% for
income higher than $9000; for families with two or more children, 18.4% of the first $5714 of
income, reduced by 13.14% for income higher than $9000. And the numbers $5714 and $9000
are inflation adjusted using 1987 price level.
• 1993: for families with one child, 18.5% of the first $5714 of income, reduced by 13.21% for
income higher than $9000; for families with two or more children, 19.5% of the first $5714 of
income, reduced by 13.93% for income higher than $9000. And the numbers $5714 and $9000
are inflation adjusted using 1987 price level.
• 1994: for families with no child, 7.65% of the first $4000, reduced by 7.65% for income higher
than $5000; for families with one child, 26.3% of the first $7750 of income, reduced by 15.98%
for income higher than $11000; for families with two or more children, 30% of the first $8425
of income, reduced by 21.06% for income higher than $11000.
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• 1995: for families with no child, 7.65% of the first $4000, reduced by 7.65% for income
higher than $5000; for families with one child, 34% of the first $6000 of income, reduced
by 15.98% for income higher than $11000; for families with two or more children, 36% of the
first $8425 of income, reduced by 20.22% for income higher than $11000. And the numbers
$4000, $5000,$6000,$8425, and $11000 are inflation adjusted using 1994 price level.
• 1996-2001: for the families with no child, 7.65% of the first $4000, reduced by 7.65% for income
higher than $5000, for families with one child, 34% of the first $6000 of income, reduced by
15.98% for income higher than $11000; for families with two or more children, 40% of the first
$8425 of income, reduced by 20.22% for income higher than $11000. And the numbers $4000,
$5000,$6000,$8425, and $11000 are inflation adjusted using 1994 price level.
• 2002-2004: for families with no child, 7.65% of the first $4000, reduced by 7.65% for income
higher than $5000, for families with one child, 34% of the first $6000 of income, reduced by
15.98% for income higher than $11000; for families with two or more children, 40% of the first
$8425 of income, reduced by 20.22% for income higher than $11000. The phase-out starting
level increased by $1000. And the numbers $4000, $5000,$6000,$8425, and $11000 are inflation
adjusted using 1994 price level.
• 2005-2007: for families with no child, 7.65% of the first $4000, reduced by 7.65% for income
higher than $5000; for families with one child, 34% of the first $6000 of income, reduced by
15.98% for income higher than $11000; for families with two or more children, 40% of the first
$8425 of income, reduced by 20.22% for income higher than $11000. The phase-out starting
level increased by $2000. And the numbers $4000, $5000,$6000,$8425, and $11000 are inflation
adjusted using 1994 price level.
• 2008: for families with no child, 7.65% of the first $4000, reduced by 7.65% for income higher
than $5000; for families with one child, 34% of the first $6000 of income, reduced by 15.98%
for income higher than $11000; for families with two or more children, 40% of the first $8425
of income, reduced by 20.22% for income higher than $11000. The phase-out starting level
increased by $3000. And the numbers $4000, $5000,$6000,$8425, and $11000 are inflation
adjusted using 1994 price level.
• 2009-2016: for families with no child, 7.65% of the first $4000, reduced by 7.65% for income
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higher than $5000; for families with one child, 34% of the first $6000 of income, reduced by
15.98% for income higher than $11000; for families with two children, 40% of the first $8425
of income, reduced by 20.22% for income higher than $11000; for families with three or more
children, 45% of the first $8425, reduced by 21.06% for the income more than $11000. The
phase-out starting level increased by $5000. And the numbers $4000, $5000,$6000,$8425, and
$11000 are inflation adjusted using 1994 price level.
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Appendix F Utility Maximization Framework
CCTC changes the incentives faced by the parents, especially the mothers. The results
obtained from the analysis of the CCTC reflect a substitution effect for the marginal population.
A mother with young children maximizes her utility function denoted as
Ui = U(Gi, Ci, li), (2)
where Gi is consumption goods, Ci is child outcome, and li is leisure. Within the utility function,
the child outcome is produced according to a production function denoted by
Ci = C(mi, di, Gi), (3)
where mi is mother’s time input on child care, and di is purchased time on child care.
The mother is subject to several constraints. Her budget constraint is
PG ·Gi + Pd · di = W · hi + Ei, (4)
where PG is the price of the consumption good, Pd is the price of purchased child care, W is the
wage, hi is labor supply, and Ei is non-labor income. The mother’s constraint of time allocation is
hi + li +mi = 1. (5)
The amount of time necessary for the children to be taken care of differs according to the number
and age of her children, available alternative arrangements, etc. The time constraint imposed by
the need of children is
di +mi = Hi, (6)
where Hi is hours necessary for the children to be taken care of.
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The utility maximization problem is
Max
{G,h,m,d,l}
Ui(Gi, C(mi, di, Gi), li),
s.t. PG ·Gi + Pd · di = W · hi + Ei , mi + di = Hi , and hi + li +mi = 1.
Solving the system for the first order conditions and assuming there are interior solutions yields
hi = F (PG, Pd,W,Ei, Hi), (7)
Gi = F (PG, Pd,W,Ei, Hi), (8)
di = F (PG, Pd,W,Ei, Hi), (9)
mi = F (PG, Pd,W,Ei, Hi), (10)
and
li = F (PG, Pd,W,Ei, Hi). (11)
Here, the variable of interest is hi, the maternal labor supply. It is a function of the price of
consumption goods, the price of purchased child care, one’s own wage rate, non-labor income, and
time necessary for the child care. The child care tax credit can come into the system in two ways.
It can reflect the change of child care price, or, assuming money is fungible, it can also reflect the
change of wage net of the cost of working.
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Appendix G Summary Statistics for Samples Used to Per-
form Instrumental Variables Estimation
Table A4: Summary Statistics for the sub-sample with lower family income
Married Single
LFP rate(%) 67.8 75.9
(46.72) (42.76)
Work Hours 1115.4 1129.3
(906.13) (949.40)
Work Hours(1-3000) 1465.3 1527.9
(687.14) (691.31)
Age 30.4 30.6
(6.59) (6.68)
Years of Education 11.9 12.0
(3.28) (2.65)
Husband’s annual income($) 27859.8
(14544.65)
Number of Children 2.06 2.06
(0.98) (1.02)
State-level CCTC($) 1003.6 940.0
(682.95) (615.98)
Individual CCTC($) 504.9 686.4
(357.38) (512.14)
State-level EITC($) 916.0 1101.5
(765.74) (883.36)
Individual EITC($) 564.3 944.9
(588.32) (797.89)
White 54.69% 26.89%
Black 31.53% 63.24%
Latino 12.23% 8.85%
Other Races 1.55% 1.03%
Observations 36,688 22,050
Notes: Samples are from PSID 1968-2015 waves, all women aged 20 to 55, either a household head or wife
of a household head, and with husband’s annual income lower than $50,000. Husband’s income, number
of children, the CCTC and the EITC are all conditional on positive values. All money terms are inflation
adjusted using 2015 price. Standard deviations are in the parentheses.
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